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West Papua: 1969 vote a 
sham 
The 1969 Act of Free Choice, intended to be an act of self-determination for the people of West Papua, 
was a 'sham' and doomed to failure from the outset, indicates a landmark report commissioned by the 
Dutch government. The 700-page report by historian Professor Pieter Drooglever was launched by the 
Institute of Dutch History in the Hague on 15 November. It supports the Papuans' persistent 
contention that the 1969 vote was a fraud and the root cause of their problems to this day. 
Suharto in charge 
The Papuans' fate was sealed when Indonesia's autocratic 
President, Suharto, whose army was in control of the terri-
tory, stipulated that no outcome of the Act of Free Choice 
'other than a ruling in favour of Indonesia would be accept-
able to him' reveals Drooglever. 
According to Western observers and Papuans who have 
spoken out, 'the Act of Free Choice ended up as a sham 
where a press-ganged electorate acting under a great deal of 
pressure appeared to have unanimously declared itself in 
favour of Indonesia,' 
This led to decades of harsh military rule and violence 
during which 'not a day went by ... when no one died or no 
one was seriously mistreated .... Figures running into the 
tens of thousands have been mentioned' for the number of 
people who fell victim, notes Drooglwer. 
West Papua's abundant natural resources have been ruth-
lessly exploited for the benefit of the military, the 
Indonesian treasury, and the elite in Jakarta, leaving the 
Papuan population as 'one of the poorest groups in 
Indonesia'. 
All this has resulted from persistent and disastrous fail-
ures of policy by the Netherlands, Indonesia and the inter-
national community. Since the 1960s, the Papuans have 
suffered from the Netherlands' failure to oversee a success-
ful decolonisation process, from Jakarta's reliance on 
repression to subjugate the Papuan people, and the interna-
tional community's failure to protect the rights of the 
indigenous population. Above all, the Papuans have 
suffered from the failure of those in power to respect their 
right to determine their own future and control their own 
affairs free from violence and oppression. 
Papuans' wisdom, resilience and dignity 
provide hope 
But, says Drooglever, hope for the future lies in 'the 
possibilities of Papuan society itself, which has produced 
the necessary self-control, wisdom and resilience to ensure 
its survival' and in the 'dignified and insistent manner' in 
which leading Papuans in church and society have brought 
the voice of the Papuans to the world's attention. It also lies 
in the interest shown by the international community, which 
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can be a driving force for change and may 
have unfulfilled responsibilities under interna-
tional Jaw. 
Professor Drooglever, was set his task by 
the Dutch government in 2000, following a 
request from the Dutch parliament, to conduct 
historical research into the events surrounding 
the Act of Free Choice. He completed the 
project despite a lack of co-operation from the 
Indonesian authorities who refused him access 
to its archives and permission to enter the 
country. 
In a statement, TAPOL welcomed the 
Drooglever report. It urged the interested 
parties, especially the Indonesian government 
and military, to avoid knee-jerk responses, to 
reflect carefully on and learn from the report's 
findings, and to seek peaceful ways, through 
dialogue and negotiation, to resolve the histor-
ical and contemporary injustices suffered by 
the Papuan people. 
Drooglever cites with approval a statement 
by former Indonesian foreign minister, Adam 
Malik, that 'the army would first have to be 
withdrawn before Papuan society would be . · T k 17 J\r b 
1 d 1 ' Th · t t th. d Papuan protestors outside the Dutch Embassy m Ja arta, HOvem er ab e to eve op . at remams rue o is ay, 
but, as Drooglever points out, since Malik 
spoke, the pressure exerted by the army and police on the 
population has only increased. A reversal of this trend -
now accelerating with the deployment of large numbers of 
additional territorial and combat troops - would be a start 
and a sign of Indonesia's commit-
ment to a political solution to the 
conflict. 
The surrounding events 
In 1949, sovereignty over the 
territories of the former Dutch East 
Indies apart from West Papua (then 
known as Dutch New Guinea), was 
formally transfered to the Republic 
of Indonesia following a Round 
Table Conference between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia. For 
strategic reasons - and because of 
'the entirely different national char-
the duration of the UN transition period and the guarantees 
for the implementation of an internationally acceptable 
referendum. 
The Papuans were not a party to the Agreement and were 
not even consulted despite the fact that by 1961 there 
existed 'the unmistakable begin-
ning of the formation of a Papuan 
state' with the adoption of a flag 
and national anthem and the estab-
lishment of a New Guinea Council. 
acter and the virtual absence of Protest in Jayapura following publication of 
Indonesian nationalistic sentiment Drooglever report 
among the population' - the Dutch, . 
despite Indonesian objections, retained West Papua with a 
view to developing the territory and setting it on course for 
self-determination. 
'By the end of 1961 onwards, 
Jakarta's behaviour, both in word 
and deed, was outright threatening,' 
says Drooglever. After the end of 
Dutch rule in 1962, 'the UN admin-
istration [UNTEA - the UN 
Temporary Executive Authority] 
lacked the necessary power, the 
will and the expertise to bring 
about a truly neutral interim phase,' 
he says. 
By then, 'Indonesian soldiers and 
However, Indonesia persisted with its claim to sover-
eignty. This led to threats of military action and low-level 
incursions at the beginning of the 1960s. Under pressure 
from the US, which was anxious to avoid Indonesia falling 
under Communist influence in the Cold War, the Dutch 
entered into the UN-brokered 'New York Agreement' with 
Indonesia on 15 August 1962. The agreement provided for 
an initial transfer of power of West Papua to the UN to be 
followed by a transfer to Indonesia. An Act of Free Choice 
would then take place within six years, before the end of 
1969. 
Drooglever notes that the New York Agreement was 
vaguely worded on a number of essential points, including 
officials were pouring into the 
country in far larger numbers than planned and quickly took 
control. They exerted heavy pressure on the Papuans to 
choose their side publicly and to give up the dream of self-
determination. 
Thousands of victims 
Drooglever notes that 'the first signs of the violent action 
taken by the Indonesian military, which would also charac-
terise the new administratiol'l in the coming decades, soon 
appeared. Rapid impoverishment ensued, together with a 
substantial decline in legal certainty and a loss of civil 
rights across the board .... This led to increasingly negative 
reactions from the Papuans. The number of victims· quickly 
rose into the thousands'. 
continued on page 24 
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UN failed to ensure free choice 
Michel Pelletier was a member of the UN team which was supposed to assist Indonesia with the imple-
mentation of the 1969 Act of Free Choice. Following the release of Professor Pieter Drooglever's 
definitive report into the controversial process, TAPOL spoke to Pelletier about his experiences. They 
included being threatened by an Indonesian soldier at gunpoint. It is clear from what he recalls that 
the UN, under intense military and political pressure from Indonesia, did little to ensure that a genuine 
act of self-determination · took place according to international standards. 
Michel Pelletier went to West Papua (then known 
as West Irian) as a 28 year-old UN observer in the 
autumn of 1968. It was a time when the world was 
going through a momentous period of decolonisa-
tion and he arrived with an idealistic expectation 
that he would be involved in "something impor-
tant". But he was soon disillusioned by the very 
limited ability he and his colleagues had to fulfill 
their role. They were forced to operate in an 
"isolated vacuum", which meant they had no way 
of finding out much of what was happening outside 
their small compound near to the West Papuan capi-
tal, Jayapura. The presence of the Indonesian mili-
tary was overwhelming, he recalls, not just in terms 
of numbers, but also in the sense of "hovering over 
the whole thing". 
One of his earliest memories was the shock he 
felt at the impoverished state of the territory. In his . . . 
· · d 1 bl th t h f h t th 0 t h Michel Pelletier with Papuan delegates to the Drooglever report launch view, it was ep ora e a muc o w a e u c 
had done to develop West Papua had been destroyed. The 
people were extremely poor, there were no stores in 
Jayapura and medical facilities were non-existent. 
According to the 1962 New York Agreement between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands, the UN was supposed to 
'advise, assist and participate' in arrangements for the Act 
of Free Choice, which was to be carried out 'in accordance 
with international practice'. A number of UN experts were 
to remain in the territory following the transfer of adminis-
trative control to Indonesia in 1963. However, Jakarta 
made it clear that no UN officials would be allowed to stay. 
This meant there was no UN presence until the Secretary-
General's special representative, Ortiz Sanz, arrived in 
August 1968. The UN did not therefore fulfill its desig-
nated role and Indonesia was free to act as it pleased. 
The UN team, headed by Ortiz Sanz, was originally 
supposed to comprise 50 members - grossly inadequate in 
itself for a territory the size of California with a population 
then of around 700,000 - but in the event it was reduced to 
25 and then just 16 members at Indonesia's insistence. They 
included Ortiz Sanz, a number of advisers and administra-
tive staff and five observers. 
The observers' task was to monitor every aspect of the 
implementation of the New York Agreement, including 
provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech, movement and 
assembly. Their ability to do this was considerably curtailed 
by severe restrictions on their own freedom of movement -
permission from the Indonesians was required for all their 
travel around the territory. Another flagrant breach of the 
Agreement. 
Any monitoring, they were able to undertake was 
inevitably "superficial", says Pelletier, as the small team 
was normally able to be in only one place at a time. They 
had no interpreter for several months and had to rely on 
what the Indonesians told them. At times, there was so little 
for them to do that they were given "made-up" jobs, such as 
investigating the education system. 
The observers received a number of reports about the 
maltreatment of Papuans, of people being killed after cross-
ing the border from neighbouring Papua New Guinea, and 
of violence against Papuans in places such as Fak Fak and 
Sorong. The reports were passed on to Ortiz Sanz, but the 
observers were unable to investigate further. According to 
Drooglever, the number of victims had quickly risen 'into 
the thousands' soon after the Indonesian takeover in 1963. 
Threatened at gunpoint 
The observers were aware of several demonstrations by 
Papuans, but were prevented by the Indonesians from 
witnessing them. On the one occasion when Pelletier did 
attempt to attend a demonstration in Jayapura he was 
stopped in his car by an Indonesian soldier and told not to 
proceed. When he failed to turn round fast enough, the 
agitated soldier stuck a gun in his stomach to reinforce his 
order. Understandably, Pelletier was extremely frightened 
and remains angry about what happened. The incident was 
reported, but there were apparently no repercussions. It is 
reasonable to assume from this outrageous tre~tment of a 
UN official that the Indonesians had similar scant regard for 
the rights of the Papuans as Drooglever indeed confirms. 
Contact with Papuans was extremely limited. They were 
stopped from coming to see the UN team and from visiting 
the UN compound. Persons submitting petitions were not 
allowed to discuss them with the team. The extraordinary 
lengths to which Indonesia went to prevent contact with 
local people were illustrated by an incident in which a 
continued on page 24 
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Drooglever report attracts wide attention 
The publication of the report by Professor Pieter Drooglever of the Institute of Dutch History on 
the 1969 Act of Free Choice has attracted responses from many countries which will help to inter-
nationalise the issue of Papua. 
In an attempt to distance their governments from the 
avent, neither the Indonesian Government nor the Dutch 
Government sent representatives to the launch. Both 
governments refrained from making any response, probably 
afraid that the report might provoke calls 
for a 'historical rectification' of the 1969 
vote and for a referendum to be held. 
No fewer than eleven Papuans from all 
parts of West Papua made the trip to The 
Netherlands, at their own expense, eager to 
hear the results of the investigation 
concerning a matter that has been at the 
core of their grievances for nearly forty 
years. Most of the Papuans were represent-
ing their local Dewan Adat (Tribal 
Council). They attended both the launch on 
15 November and a seminar held later in 
the week, and took advantage of their pres-
ence in The Netherlands to meet the many 
Papuans living in the country. 
They virtually took over the presenta-
tion ceremony on 15 November and went 
on to the podium to sing the Papuan 
national anthem. 
On 18 November, a one-day seminar 
was held in Amersfoort, followed the next 
evening by a well-attended public meeting. 
The Papuans who addressed the public 
meeting on 19 November were Thom 
Dutch historian. 
A Jakarta fortnightly, Intelijen, carried extensive cover-
age in September about the forthcoming report. A man 
described as being one of Indonesia's intelligence experts, 
Djanda, was asked who was inciting 
the Papuans to press for independence. 
His response was: 'It's people like 
Drooglever and Langenberger (sic), 
Dutch intellectuals who feel they have 
been betrayed by Indonesia. Their 
sense of betrayal means that they want 
to humiliate Indonesia. Just wait till 15 
November when Drooglever and 
Langenberger hold a seminar.' 
He described Drooglever 
as not only an intellectual but also an 
intel, who was probably lobbied by the 
socialists. 'He has been stirring up 
Papua. He is in the pay of the OPM and 
has for many years been raising Papua 
and Indonesia on the international 
forum.' 
Beanal, the chair of Dewan Adat Papua Thom Beanal addresses a public meet-
(Papuan Tribal Council), Thaha Mohamed ing in Amersfoort 
In the words of a 
spokesman of Indonesia's Foreign 
Ministry, the Report was 'an academic 
study which is no different from other 
studies on Papua'. The spokesman, 
Yuri Oktavian Thamrin, said: 'The 
Dutch government recognises Papua 
as part of Indonesia. That's why the 
substance of the study has no legal or 
Alhamid General Secretary of the Papuan 
Presidium Council (PDP) and Wilhelmina Woy, represent-
ing the Fak-Fak Trib~I Council. . 
Thom Beanal spoke about the grave injustice of the Act 
of Free Choice while Thaha Alhamid gave an account of 
Papuan efforts to hold dialogue with the authorities in 
Jakarta. He explained that in the period following the down-
fall of the authoritarian President Suharto in May 1998, 
there was for the first time a greater willingness in Jakarta 
to respond to Papuan concerns. Under President B.J. 
Habibie, who took power after the fall of Suharto, a team of 
one hundred Papuans went to Jakarta and had a meeting 
with the President. Habibie appeared to listen carefully to 
their representations but did little more than say that he 
would look into the matter. 
From then on, all efforts to seek dialogue during the pres-
idencies of Abdurrachman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri 
and the current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
went downhill and failed to get any response. 
Jakarta government plays down the 
event 
Several weeks before the Drooglever report, Een Daad 
van Vrije Keuze (An Act of Free Choice) was due to appear, 
there were attempts in the Indonesian press to discredit the 
political relevance to the facts'. 
Members of the Indonesian Parliament rallied to the side 
of the government. A member of Parliament's Commission 
I on Foreign Affairs urged the Indonesian government to 
'counter such a finding with solid arguments and to estab-
lish lobby groups to stop it from becoming an international 
issue.' 
A seminar on West Papua to be held by LIPI, the 
Indonesia Institute of Sciences, in Jakarta to coincide with 
publication of the Drooglever report, had to be called off 
when the Indonesian government indicated that it was not 
prepared to fund the event. It was suggested that the issue 
should be discussed by the University of Indonesia. 
According to LIPI they have not been informed of the 
reason for the government's decision. 
Dutch government response 
Although the request for an investigation was made by a 
member of the Dutch Parliament and the report was 
commissioned by a previous Dutch government in 2000, the 
present government was dismissive of the investigation. 
The present Dutch Foreign Minister, Ben Bot, was quoted 
in the Dutch daily, Trouw, .as calling the investigation 
'superfluous', stating that the initiative had come from his 
predecessor, J. vanAartsen. Neither is the Dutch Parliament 
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planning to do anything with Professor Drooglever's report. 
According to the Jakarta Post: Certainly no book will by 
itself change history, Drooglever's publication has started a 
momentum that could bring Papuan politics into line with 
history.' 
While the Dutch government had signed the so-called 
New York Agreement with the Indonesian government in 
1962, which set the scene for a act of self-determination to 
take place by the end of 1969, it appears that the Dutch 
government was not happy to be associated with the inves-
tigations, which called the 1969 Act a 'sham', for fear that 
WEST PAPUA 
cated in such crimes as the murder of Theys Eluay in 
November 2001 and the Abepura incident in 2000 continue 
to enjoy impunity and according to some, should be 
rewarded as 'heroes' for risking their lives to defend the 
unity of Indonesia. 
On the Indonesian side of the dispute, he distinguishes 
between the hardliners in the military and the civilian 
bureaucracy and those intellectuals who hold moderate 
points of view. While they share the same desire to defend 
the Republic, they differ about the strategies and methods 
for achieving this. 
this might have a detrimental effect on its The hardliners reject dialogue and 
wide-ranging relations with Indonesia. --------------- go into a panic when they hear Papuan 
Clearly economic interests take precedence P.J. Drooglever calls for the rectification of history. The 
over any concern for the grievous historic EEN DAAD moderates on the other hand believe 
injustice which has been done to the that dialogue and 'straightening' the 
Papuan people. VAN history of Papua's tr.ansfer to the 
Republic are constructive ways to 
Sydney Morning Herald VRIJ E KEUZE resolving the conflict in Papua. 
While the nationalist defence of 
the unity of the Republic is, he says, 
understandable, it should be done by 
winning the hearts of Papuans and not 
frustrating them even further. He 
describes the hardliners attitude as 
'terribly dangerous', that can only lead 
to more violence, 'simply push(ing) the 
Papuans out of the Republic without 
them being the cause.' 
De Papoea's In an editorial following the publication 
of the report, Australia's leading daily, the 
Sydney Morning Herald wrote: 
van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea 
en de grenzen van 
het zelfbeschikkingsrecht 
Jakarta 'energises' the 
Papuans 
"There is always merit in setting the 
record straight, no matter how much time 
has passed. For the Indonesian province of 
Papua, it has been a long and bloody 36-
year wait. The Papuans have refused to 
accept the 'Act of Free Choice' by which 
they supposedly voted to join Indonesia in 
1969. A report commissioned by the Dutch 
government unequivocally vindicates their 
stand. The resource rich territory of Papua 
was not included when the Dutch handed 
h · l · l · · Drooglever report over t elf co oma terr1tones to a new 
The Indonesian government 
should abandon the illusion that the 
idea of m~rdeka can be removed by educating the Papuans, 
punishing them and disrespecting their human dignity. The 
consequences of such an erroneous approach is that: 'With 
every wrong move of Jakarta, the Papuan heart that bleeds 
with pain and cries for more sovereignty will beat harder 
and harder. Jakarta seems to provide the spirit and energy 
for Papuans to remain hopeful of an independent state.' 
Indonesian nation after World War II. Instead, the Papuans 
- who share no religious or cultural ties with majority 
Muslim Indonesia - were promised a popular ballot on inde-
pendence. But a mere 1,000 or so Papuans participated in 
the 'sham' rigged vote orchestrated by Jakarta, the report 
says. The result has been a protracted, debilitating indepen-
dence struggle, pitting a vicious Indonesian army against 
ill-equipped Papuan tribes.' 
The views of an Indonesian historian 
One of the speakers to address the seminar on 18 
November was Muridan Widjojo, a Research Fellow of the 
Indonesian Institute of Sciences, LIPL Muridan is a PhD 
Candidate in History of Maluku and Papua at 
Rijksuniversiteit in Leiden. 
His paper, Bridging the Gap or Pushing Papua out of the 
Republic? is a carefully structured analysis of the opposing 
views of Papuans and Indonesians on the status of West 
Papua, from the perspective of a writer who sympathises 
with both sides of the argument. After giving an account of 
the diverse social and religious views of Papuans and the 
commitment of the PDP and the OPM to a peaceful strug-
gle, he draws attention to what he calls 'the most painful 
miscommunication between Papuans and policy makers in 
Jakarta'. From the days of Sukarno up to the present era, 
sentiments in Indonesia have been deeply nationalistic. 
Papua is approached as an 'unquestionable issue' and any 
discussion is seen as a 'threat to the near-sacred "imagined-
community" of Indonesia'. Police and TNI officers impli-
Jakarta may see Special Autonomy as the solution but 
Muridan argues that it has brought Papuan trust to its lowest 
level. The reasons are that Papuans have not had the space 
to determine political and developmental affairs in their 
own province. The government has systematically ignored 
respect for human .rights, and the destructive power of 
corruption, and intervenes in political processes without 
giving a voice to Papuan civil society groups. Moreover, 
there is little indication . that educational facilities, health 
services and general prosperity will improve. 
Above all, says Muridan in conclusion, Jakarta must 
show a sincere commitment to the dignity of the Papuans as 
owners of the land. · 
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Security forces on high alert 
Developments in West Papua are in stark contrast to the progress being made in Aceh. Plans to_ send mflre 
troops have again been announced, while a leaked police document reveals plans for actw!" apamst 
activists, particularly those involved in flag-raising. Local communities have expressed strong oh1ectwns to 
plans to deploy troops in their localities. 
The leaked police document, dated 10 November 2005, 
is proof that the Indonesian authorities are well aware of the 
depth of dissatisfaction among West Papuans about their 
plight under Indonesian occupation. 
The document is an instruction from the chief of police 
in Papua, Drs D. Sumantyawan, H.S, to police chiefs 
throughout West Papua, warning of possible 'separatist' 
actions on certain occasions in November and December. 
The occasions mentioned as possible triggers for action are 
the anniversary of the death of Papuan leader, Theys Eluay 
on 10/11 November, the launch of the Drooglever report on 
15 November, West Papua's national day on 1 December 
and what is described as the anniversary of Melanesian 
independence on 14 December. · 
Local police commands are instructed to identify local 
targets and to increase the number of personnel in remote 
locations, in anticipation of actions by armed groups. Local 
communities, it says, should be encouraged to organise 
sporting or other events in places likely to be the venue for 
protest gatherings, to involve themselves in 'voluntary' 
work projects under the supervision of the police and army, 
and to organise religious activities to distract attention from 
events planned by separatists. Police patrols should be 
intensified in the towns and in remote areas, on days of 
possible separatist activity. Raids should be launched to 
confiscate firearms and other weapons. 
Flag-raisers should face treason charges 
The police instruction states further that those involved 
in flag-raising should be arrested and charged with treason 
(makar). The police are advised not to resort to acts of 
violence unless this is necessary because of the circum-
stances, and firearms should only be resorted to on orders 
from superior officers. This note of caution suggests that the 
security forces see the need to avoid casualties which could 
attract international attention. 
As already reported [see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 179, July 
2005], two West Papuans are currently serving sentences of 
fifteen and ten years for peacefully hoisting the West 
Papuan Morning Star flag on 1December2004. Both men 
have been adopted as prisoners of conscience by Amnesty 
International. 
More clashes in Jayapura 
On 1 December this year, hundreds of students, workers 
and government employees gathered in Jayapura and 
yelled: 'Free Papua!' as they blocked roads in Abepura, 
where the state university, Cendrawasih, is located. 
According to reports received by the Robert F. Kennedy 
Memorial Center for Human Rights, the demonstration was 
initially peaceful. Demonstrators were intending to raise the 
West Papuan flag on the Trikora field in Abepura where 
demonstrations in 2004 resulted in the arrest of Filep Karma 
and Yusak Pakage (the two men now serving sentences of 
15 and 1 O years) after being blocked by Brim ob forces, the 
crack troops of the police. 
This year, hundreds (according to some sources, thou-
sands) of Papuans sat down on the roadway blocking the 
traffic on the road connecting Abepura with Jayapura. The 
sit-down continued for several hours, until a heavy down-
pour of rain forced the protesters to seek shelter. 
According to a report in The Jakarta Post [2 December], 
the police were determined to keep the pro-independence 
action low-key. Hundreds of police had been deployed since 
early morning to prevent anyone raising the flag. Using logs 
to block the street in front of Cendrawasih University, the 
disappointed demonstrators pelted stones at university 
buildings, shattering some windows. 
The hundreds of independence supporters then marched 
to the campus of a nearby Protestant bible college and 
unfurled a banner saying: '44th Anniversary of West 
Papuan Independence!' Under tight security, they held a 
rally at which speakers spoke of Papua's incorporation into 
Indonesia. two people were detained for putting logs on the 
road, but police later said they were only held for question-
ing. 
Commemorative events also were held in Sentani, near 
the home of Theys Hiyo Eluay, who was abducted and 
killed by security forces in November 2001. Prayers were 
said and an address was delivered condemning the vote held 
in 1969 which led to Papua's incorporation into Indonesia. 
Papuan flag raised in prison 
In defiance of his jailers, Filep Karma startled the prison 
authorities by unfurling the Morning Star flag on the prison 
roof on 1 December. Filep Karma is serving a 15-year 
sentence. 
According to The Jakarta Post, Filep Karma said: 
'Although I am being kept in jail, it does not dampen my 
spirit to fight for independence.' He refused however to 
reveal who smuggled the flag into the jail. He also said that 
he had done this despite the possible consequences. 
It was later revealed that his sentence has indeed been 
extended by decision of the Supreme Court, but at the time 
of writing, the document announcing the Court's verdict had 
not been given to him. 
Communities reject military presence 
Traditional communities in villages located in the north-
east of West Papua, in the vicinity of Jayapura, have come 
together in a Coalition to voice their rejection of the deploy-
ment of troops of the Indonesian army, the TNI, in their 
respective village!:;. In a document dated 21 November 
2005, which is based on reliable local sources, they itemise 
the placement of units of fifteen soldiers in their kampungs 
(a kampung is the lowest-level residential unit in 
Indonesian cities and towns). 
The report give details about placements in a number of 
continued on page 7 
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Deployment of water cannons violates Papuan 
rights 
Two British-supplied Tactica armoured personnel carriers fitted with water cannons have been deployed to West 
Papua to be used against protestors. The very presence of the vehicles is a powerful deterrent to Papuans wishing 
to participate in public events and a flagrant breach of their rights to freedom of assembly and expression. 
The water cannons have arrived in West 
Papua at a time of heightened tension. Large 
numbers of additional troops are being sent to 
the territory and the police have been under , 
instructions to prevent people participating in I 
public actions on a number of important dates in 
November and December [see separate article, 
'Security forces on high alert']. 
TAPOL understands that the vehicles were I 
sent to the West Papuan capital, Jayapura, from 
Aceh at the beginning of August. They were 
present during a large demonstration against 
special autonomy on 12 August and at a protest 
against the establishment of the Papuan People's 
Assembly (MRP) at the Governor's office on 31 
October. Tactica armoured vehicle(left) with water cannon in Jayapura 
The Foreign Office in London says that the 
water cannons were also used on an unspecified date to 
break up a violent demonstration aimed at an office of the 
Indonesian Electoral Commission. Information about this 
demonstration is extremely sketchy and has not been 
confirmed. Serious questions would in any event have to be 
asked about the cause of the alleged violence given the 
propensity of the security forces to start or provoke inci-
dents by the use of heavy-handed tactics or other means. 
An informed source has told TAPOL that a salt/liquid 
soap solution has been added to the water in the cannons to 
produce a tear gas-like effect on those targeted. This is a 
common practice in Indonesia where water cannons were 
used on many occasions in the 1990s against the pro-
democracy movement opposed to the Suharto dictatorship. 
The water cannon vehicles were licensed for export to 
Indonesia by the Conservative government in the 1990s. A 
number of them were not delivered until after Tony Blair's 
districts in the vicinity of Jayapura, the Districts of West 
Sentani, Nimbokrang, Nimboran, Namblong, Kemtuk 
Gresi, Demta, Depapre and Kaureh. 
For example, in the District of Demta, a local inhabitant 
identified only by the initials DY reported that the district 
military commander had visited him to inform him that 
security personnel would be placed in three kampungs. 
Another informant, LW, described how an army officer had 
informed him that troops would be deployed from 9 
November till the end of December, and would be billeted 
in the homes of the inhabitants. In both cases, the infor-
mants said they rejected the presence of military personnel 
in their kampungs. 
Similar reports of deployment were included in the 
Coalition's report for all the other districts. In two 
kampungs in the District of Kaureh, it was stated that 
twelve military personnel would be located in all the nine 
barracks of a local company, PT Sinar Mas, which means 
Labour government came to power in May 1997. It contro-
versially refused to revoke the export licences despite 
promising an 'ethical dimension' to its foreign policy. The 
Tacticas were made by Glover Webb, a company then 
owned by GKN, which has since been absorbed into the 
BAE Systems conglomerate. 
MPs appalled 
UK parliamentarians opposed to arms sales to Indonesia 
have reacted angrily to the deployment of the water 
cannons. In a parliamentary motion, 38 MPs said they were 
'appalled at the reported deployment of British-supplied 
equipment by Indonesian forces against civilians in West 
Papua'. They called for a halt to all arms and equipment 
supplies and an investigation into the abuses of human 
rights in West Papua [Early Day Motion 1131, 28 
November 2005]. 
continued on page 14 
that a total of 108 soldiers would be deployed in that loca-
tion. · 
A note in the concluding section of the report explains 
that the authorities claimed that the deployments were 
necessary because of the alleged disappearance of a heli-
copter on 12 October but no villagers had seen or heard a 
helicopter flying in the area. After extensive searches, no 
helicopter was found and local people concluded that the 
story was simply a pretext to justify the deployment of addi-
tional troops. 
The report stated in conclusion that local communities 
reject the deployment of additional troops 'because there 
already are Koramil and Polsek (army and police) 
command stations in these locations. So what need is there 
for more security personnel since conditions in the area are 
very peaceful, there is no war in progress and the people are 
busily engaged in their gardens, out at sea, taking their chil-
dren to school and a number of other social activities? 
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Famine and neglect in a land of plenty 
In early December, it was reported that fifty-five Papuans had died because of lack off ood in the 
district of Yahukimo, while more that one hundred were suffering from famine-related ailments. While 
efforts were being made to send /ood to the area, a senior government official alleged that the reports 
were untrue. Several weeks earlier, a report about West Papua by the World Bank said that West Papua 
has the highest level of poverty in Indonesia. 
The district ofYahukimo is some 800 kms from the capi-
tal, Jayapura, and is situated in the Baliem Valley. The near-
est town is Wamena. While efforts were being made to send 
emergency food supplies, it was reported that bad weather 
and the remoteness of the affected region were hampering 
the relief effort. 
Inappropriate intervention in aid distribution by the 
police and military and local corruption may have made 
matters worse. 
From Jakarta it was reported that, on hearing of these 
deaths, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono instructed a 
senior member of his cabinet, Aburizal Bakri, to go to the 
region. While little was said about how long the minister 
spent in the region and whether he had managed to reach the 
affected area, he was subsequently reported as saying that 
the reports about famine and deaths were untrue, and that he 
had seen plenty of fat people. 
Although information about the situation in 
Yahukimo has been sketchy and difficult to 
obtain, it seems clear that this area of the 
Highlands is facing a serious problem with 
hunge·r and malnutrition. In this instance, the 
food shortage appears to have been caused by a 
failure of the sweet potato crop because of 
excessive rain in recent years and the lack of an 
appropriate response from the provincial and 
local authorities. 
Starvation in a land of plenty 
Indonesia's leading English-language daily, 
The Jakarta Post, said that some government 
officials 'have gone so far as to deny any malnu-
trition at all in the regency, a common tactic I 
during the New Order regime' . 
'The horrible irony of the Yahukimo famine,' .....__ __ _ 
wrote the daily, 'is that it occurs in a province 
that is immensely rich in natural resources. Papua has 
millions of hectares of virgin tropical forest and huge gas 
and mineral deposits. Some of this natural wealth has been 
exploited for decades, but the riches have not trickled down 
to (ordinary) Papuans.' 
A church missionary, Sister Sue Triner, who has been living 
for years in Papua and recently visited Yahukimo, said the 
food aid helped save the lives of residents in the famine-
affected area. If the food aid had not been dropped into the 
area, the starvation would have been much more severe and 
would have cost more lives, she said. [Jakarta Post, 14 
December 2005] 
Is hunger in Yakuhimo deliberate? 
A food policy specialist published an analysis of why 
food shortages have occurred in Papua. Jonathan Lassa who 
wrote his doctoral thesis on 'Food Politics and Food Aid' 
said that there had been a policy of switching food 
consumption away from traditional foods such as sweet 
potatoes to rice. 'Yakuhimo cannot attain food sufficiency in 
rice and must therefore rely on supplies from outside.' 
Inevitably, transportation costs severely affect the cost of 
food. He said that the policy of switching consumption 
habits from traditional crops to rice seriously affected 
people's food sovereignty. He said that local officials had 
introduced what they described as superior seeds with 
higher yields. But such crops require elaborate storage 
which added to costs. This also undermined local sover-
eignty over food consumption, switching away from crops 
that are more compatible with the local ecology and culture. 
He wrote in conclusion: 'Such inappropriate policies often 
compel me to draw the conclusion that hunger and death in 
Yakuhimo are the result of a deliberate interaction between 
development disasters and developing disasters.' 
·--··--
-· -
World Bank: Highest level 
of poverty 
In November 2005, the World 
Bank released a report, Papua Public 
Expenditure Analysis which points out 
that Papua 'has the highest level of 
poverty in all of Indonesia. In 2003,' it 
said, '38 per cent of Papua's population 
were living in poverty, more than 
double the national average of 17 per 
cent.' The Bank's report also pointed out 
that there were significant variations in 
poverty rates between districts and 
towns, ranging from 23 per cent in the 
city of Jayapura to 56 per cent in 
Bintuni Bay. It is worth noting that 
Bintuni Bay is the location of what will 
be Indonesia's largest exploitation of 
natural gas by BP, a British company. 
(The World Bank report did not draw attention to the chang-
ing composition of the population, with immigrants 
accounting for an increasing percentage of the population, 
especially in urban areas.) 
The World Bank report also drew attention to the cost of 
living in Papua which varies enormously from district to 
district. In Jayawijaya district, it said, prices for basic essen-
tials were one hundred times (sic) higher than in coastal 
towns. The difference was due primarily to the cost of trans-
portation. , 
As for the availability of health services, the World Bank 
report said: 'Few Papuans have access to good health facil-
ities .. .. More than 90 per cent of villages in Papua do not 
have basic health facilities such as health centres, doctors 
and midwives, and 70 per cent of these villages have diffi-
cult access to such facilities in other villages.' 
On education, the World Bank report states that Papua's 
education indicators are consistently lower than the national 
average. Although it states that Papua has relatively more 
continued on page 20 
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Freeport's role exposed 
The US mining giant Freeport-McMoran continues to reap fabulous profits from the gold and copper 
it has extracted from West Papua since clinching a deal with Suharto in 1967. The company depends 
heavily for its security on the Indonesian army and has paid huge sums of money to army officers for 
their services. Britain's Rio Tinto also profits from the extraction of Papua's wealth. 
A front-page article in the · New York Times on 27 
December, The Cost of Gold - The Hidden Payroll: Below 
a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste, published also in 
the International Herald Tribune, has focused international 
attention on the operations of the mining company that has 
become Indonesia's largest tax-payer and controls what is 
acknowledged to be the world's largest gold reserve and the 
world's third largest copper deposit. 
The Times article follows an in-depth report on the rela-
tionship between the Freeport Mine and the Indonesian 
security forces, Paying for Protection, published by the 
non-governmental organisation Global Witness in July 
2005. 
Unable to visit the site of the mine as the company and 
the Indonesian government refused permission despite 
repeated requests, the authors of The Times article were 
compelled to rely on several months of research through 
email and with the help of more than thirty former and 
present company employees most of whom withheld their 
names for fear of retribution. Freeport 'has bored out of its 
Grasburg mine an almost bottomless store of gold. Satellite 
images show a spreading soot-coloured bruise of almost a 
billion tons of mine waste that the New Orleans-based 
company has dumped directly into a jungle river of what 
had been one of the world's last untouched landscapes,' says 
the article 
Shielded by the military 
Behind a solid shield of military protection, Freeport has 
'managed to maintain a nearly impenetrable redoubt in the 
easternmost Indonesian province as it taps one of the coun-
try's richest assets.' According to company records obtained 
by The Times, the company gave military and police gener-
als, colonels, majors and captains, and military units nearly 
$20 million, while individual officers received tens of thou-
sands of dollars, in one case up to $150,000. A former 
Indonesian attorney general told the paper that it was ille-
gal under Indonesian law for officers to accept direct 
payments. Current and former employees told of a covert 
programme - email messages intercepted to spy on the 
company's environmental opponents. 
The company has transformed one of the world's most 
remote areas into a company town and mine 'on a scale 
unique even by the standards of modem mega-mining'. 
According to an official of Indonesia's Department of 
Energy and Mineral Resources: 'If any operation like this 
was put forward now, it wouldn't be allowed. But now the 
operation exists and many people depend on it,' said Witoro 
Sulamo. 
As a company with $2.3 billion in revenues, it has 
become among the biggest - and in some years the biggest 
- source of revenue for the Indonesian government. From 
1992 to 2004, Freeport provided Indonesia with $33 billion 
in direct and indirect benefits, almost 2 per cent of 
Indonesia's gross domestic product. 
Under special autonomy, Papua is supposed to receive 80 
per cent. of revenues from Freeport. According a recent 
World Bank report, Papua Public Expenditure Analysis, 
such autonomy funds have boosted development spending, 
but they have partially substituted for regular development 
funds instead of increasing them and there has been little 
progress in the key areas of health and education. Levels 
of poverty remain the highest in Indonesia [see separate 
article, 'Famine and neglect in a land of plenty'] 
Although it has been warned frequently by Jakarta's 
Environment Ministry that it was breaching environmental 
laws, the regulatory tools were 'so weak' that it was like 
'painting on clouds' to persuade it to comply with official 
requests to reduce environmental damage. By the 
company's own estimates, it will generate an estimated six 
billion tons of waste before it is through - more than twice 
as much earth as was excavated for the Panama Canal. 
According to a report commissioned by the company not 
previously made public but made available to The Times, 
the rivers upstream and the wetlands inundated with waste 
are now unsuitable for aquatic life. 
As for human rights violations, according to anthropologist 
Chris Ballard who worked for Freeport, and Abigail Abrash, 
an American human rights campaigner, an estimated 160 
people have been killed by the military between 1975 and 
1997 in the mine and its surroundings. 
Deal with the devil 
After a series of riots in March 1996 in which military 
personnel in mufti took part, the mine was forced to shut 
down for three days; $3 million worth of equipment was 
destroyed. To deal with the crisis, CEO James Moffett 
rushed to the scene and held a meeting of army officers 
presided over by Major-General Prabowo Subianto, the 
son-in-law of the dictator, Suharto who told him they were 
ready to help. Entering into what has been called a 'deal 
with the devil', the armed forces drew up a bill of $35 
million for infrastructure for the army - barracks, roads, and 
scores of heavy vehicles - which would need to be replaced 
every few years. This resulted in p~yments of at least $20 
million from 1998 to May 2004 and additional payments of 
$10 million. Current and former employees told The Times 
'it was likely that much of the money went into the officers' 
pockets'. Records show that the largest recipient was Lt Col 
Togap F. Gultom, commander of the troops in the Freeport 
area who received $100,000 for 'food costs' for six months 
in 2001 and more than $150,000 in the following year. The 
company also gave a total of $350,000 to ten other 
commanders also for 'food costs' even though Freeport had 
allowed the soldiers to eat in their mess and had trucked 
food to more distant kitchens. 
In April 2002, the company gave Major-General Mahidin 
Simbolon - then senior commander of forces in Papua and 
formerly responsible for counter-insurgency operations and 
militia training in East Timor - $64,000, followed eight 
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months later by another $67,000 accord-
ing to Global Witness. The Times request 
to interview Simbolon was rejected. 
Freeport has resisted any detailed 
disclosure of its payments to the military, 
claiming they are legal and even required 
by Indonesian law. Bur former minister 
of justice Marsillam Simanjuntak told 
The Times it was in violation of 
Indonesian law for soldiers and police 
officers to accept payments from a 
company. 
Killings unsolved 
The questionable relationship between 
Freeport and the Indonesian military 
came under scrutiny following the killing 
of two Americans and an Indonesian near 
to the mine in the district of Timika in 
August 2002. 
Initial investigations by the 
Indonesian police provided strong indi-
cations that Kopassus special forces or Global Witness report 
other army units were involved. US offi-
cials had similar suspicions. It was thought that the attack 
was intended to be a warning to Freeport not to cut its 
support for the military. 
A joint investigation by the Indonesian police and the 
FBI faced persistent obstructions by the military. An 
alleged member of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) 
Anth?nius Wamang, has been indicted in a US court, but 
remams at large. The case now appears to have stalled and 
many questions about who was responsible remain unan-
swered [See 'Freeport indictment leaves many unanswered 
questions', TAPOL Bulletin, No. 176, p. 18]. 
Mine waste clog rivers 
While Indonesia's environmental ministry has stood by 
powerless, the company informed the government that the 
waste rock in the highlands, 900 feet deep in places, now 
covers about three square miles. What was once one of the 
richest freshwater habitats in the world is now buried in 
mine waste with levels of copper and sediment so high that 
· almost all the fish have disappeared. Yet no government in 
Jakarta to this day has dared encroach on Freeport's prerog-
atives. Indonesia's environment minister Sonny Keraf 
argued that Freeport should be forced to pay compensation 
for the rivers, forests and fish that its operations had 
destroyed, but to no avail 
To counter growing outrage at the consequences of 
Freeport mining operations, the company agreed in 1996 to 
pay 1 per cent of revenues annually for development 
projects in Papua. However, Thom Beanal, chief of the 
Amungme tribe, whose lands have been taken over for the 
mine, says the combined weight of the Indonesian govern-
ment and Freeport has left his people in bad shape. Yes, he 
said, they have provided electricity, schools and hospitals 
but the infrastructure was built mainly for the benefit of 
Freeport. 
Military admit money received 
Stunned by the revelations in the New York Times, 
Indonesian officials have been compelled to respond. 
Following the publication of the 
article in The Times, the Indonesian 
military acknowledged for the first 
time that its commanders in West 
Papua had received 'support' from the 
U.S. gold-mining giant - responding 
to allegations that Freeport-
McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. 
(FCX), gave the army millions of 
dollars to protect its facilities in the 
remote province. Maj. Gen. Kohirin 
Suganda said the armed forces 'as an 
institution' had never received dona-
tions from the New Orleans-based 
company. 'But we have heard that 
Freeport provides support such as 
vehicles, fuel and meals directly to 
the units in the field,' Suganda said. 
'That's the company's policy. It was 
not done because we requested it.' 
But when asked about the payments, 
the commander in chief of the 
~------..... Indonesian armed forces, General 
December 2005] 
Endriartono Sutarto would only say: 
'Please ask Freeport, not me.' [AP, 29 
Another respo·nse to the NYT 's exposure came from 
Indonesia's Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono He was 
quoted as saying that local and international companies 
should not make direct payments to military officers guard-
ing their operations as the practice is illegal. He added that 
according the a ministerial policy statement in 2000, 
payments for security arrangements should be made to 
related government agencies, that is to say not to officers or 
the military. [Jakarta Post, 30 December 2005]. 
Global Witness has called for greater transparency in 
payments by oil and mining companies to governments and 
security forces, especially in conflict areas such as West 
Papua. It has recommended an investigation into the rela-
tionship between Freeport and the Indonesian military and 
police by law enforcement authorities in the US and 
Indonesia. 
It will be interesting to see whether anything changes. 
Breaking News 
. Reports h~e been received that 12 Papuans suspected of 
involvement zn the Freeport killings, were arrested on 11 
January 2006. They were detained in Timika and later 
transferred to Jayapura for interrogation. Those in custody 
include Anthonius Wamang and Rev. Isak Ondawame, a 
well-known local pastor and human rights advocate. This 
appears to be a joint operation carried out by the 
Indonesian authorities ahd the FBI. 
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Peace process on the right track 
After the Aceh peace accord was signed on 15 August 2005, a new international body was created to 
monitor its implementation. The new body, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), has so far mediated 
four rounds of decommissioning, always the most difficult part of any peace process. 
A peace process never occurs in a straight line and more 
often than not encounters major .or minor handicaps on the 
way to a sustainable peace. The UN, which has employed 
peacekeepers in all parts of the world, reckons that, on aver-
age, it normally takes ten years before a peace process can 
find the right track and start functioning satisfactorily. 
In that sense the peace process in Aceh is rather unique. 
So far, it has run well, beyond the expectations of many 
Indonesia watchers. The almost thirty-year-long bloody 
conflict in Aceh plus the terrible violence that occurred in 
East Timor in 1999 before and after the massive vote in 
favour of independence led many observers to feel 
pessimistic about the prospects in Aceh. As it turned out, the 
successive steps in the peace process went very well: the 
Helsinki negotiations were concluded in five rounds (from 
January to Augu~t 2005), the four stages of decommission-
ing up to the end of December 2005 proceeded without inci-
dent or activities by militia who function as the proxy of the 
military, resulting in the peace process in Aceh being a shin-
ing example. 
The political will to end the conflict from the warring 
sides, the Government oflndonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) provided the foundation for this 
successful process. The desire for peace was reinforced by 
the tsunami which struck Aceh so devastatingly on 26 
December 2004. 
A vicious military operation lasting from 2003 till 2005 
had crippled people's lives in Aceh and had convinced both 
sides that a negotiated settlement was the only viable 
option. Many months before the tsunami tragedy hit Aceh, 
informal talks had been underway between the two sides in 
venues around the world. 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which sets 
out the peace accord, is a genuine expression of goodwill 
from both sides. GAM took a few steps back by withdraw-
ing their demand for independence while GoI offered wide-
ranging political and economic reforms. A new law on the 
governance of Aceh will be promulgated not later than 31 
March 2006 and political participation will be guaranteed 
for all citizens of Aceh. Amnesty has been granted to former 
GAM combatants, including those who were released from 
prison. The government has undertaken to provide facilities 
for the reintegration of former GAM combatants into soci-
ety. 
The tsunami disaster was the final trigger for the peace 
process and record-breaking reconstruction efforts coming 
from all parts of the world are creating an opportunity to 
strengthen the peace process as it paves the way for new 
possibilities for entire communities to start a new life. 
AMM, a success story 
The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was the body 
assigned to monitor the implementation of various aspects 
of the peace agreement. The AMM is an expression of the 
international community's determination to ensure that the 
peace process is implemented according to accepted inter-
national standards. 
AMM started work on 15 September and from the start it 
was clear that it was grossly understaffed (231 persons) for 
a region as big as Aceh. AMM is a project of the European 
Union in partnership with the five ASEAN member states 
(Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). It 
has set up ten offices in the region whose tasks have been 
broadly defined as follows: 
To monitor compliance with the ceasefire, the with-
drawal of paramilitary forces and government troops. To 
ensure respect for human rights under the terms of the 
MoU. In addition, to implement assistance programmes to 
secure the .EU's role in restoring security, stability, 
economic development and social justice to the region. 
To monitor the reintegration of active GAM members, 
monitor the process of legislative changes and rule on 
disputed amnesty cases. It will also deal with complaints 
and alleged violations of the MoU and establish and main-
tain liaison and good cooperation between the parties. 
The AMM is a civilian operation within the framework 
of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
Pieter Feith, a Dutch diplomat with experience in the former 
Yugoslavia conflict, is head of the mission. He has 
described the AMM as a very useful model for the future. 
He said: 'While in the military field (the EU) may not be the 
most powerful one, in terms of civil crisis management we 
have a real competitive advantage. These types of civilian 
missions are more and more on the rise You don't need 
soldiers to bring an end to conflicts nowadays.' [Financial 
Times, 7 December 2005]. 
The mandate of the AMM initially set to last until 15 
March has been extended for three or six months, depend-
ing on whether the peace process becomes self-sustaining; 
the EU is committed to continuing to support the Aceh 
peace process in the longer term. This is a commitment to 
support the re-integration of former GAM combatants into 
civil society and democratic political life, to observe the 
local elections in May/June 2006 and provide technical 
assistance and capacity-building in programmes on public 
safety, local governance, human rights and municipal elec-
tions. 
The pro-active monitoring role of AMM has so far been 
impeccable and many Acehnese activists have expressed 
their hope that it will continue its work, in particular during 
the local elections and the legislative changes and will 
continue to play a part is resolving disputed amnesty cases. 
The MoU also provided guarantees for the h_andling of 
human rights violations and alleged violations of the agree-
ment itself. These are medium-term issues and it is of 
primary importance that AMM (perhaps under a different 
name with a different mandate) continue its work in Aceh. 
While the capacity of AMM has been more than suffi-
cient in handling decommissioning, the medium-term chal-
lenges like assisting the Acehnese during the political tran-
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sition period needs people with specific knowledge of tran-
sitions towards democracy and also knowledge about the 
specific conditions in Aceh. 
Successful decommissioning 
With regard to security arrangements, the MoU provided 
the necessary steps, including four stages of decommission-
ing where GAM was obliged to demobilise all its 3,000 
troops and hand over all its weapons and ammunition while 
Jakarta was requir,ed to withdraw all its non-organic TNI 
troops and police. This procedure was implemented by 
AMM under the watchful eye of both parties. 
The first stage of demobilisation started on 15 September 
and concluded on 31 December 2005. In the first three 
rounds, GAM delivered 856 weapons to AMM, sixteen 
more than the number agreed in the MoU. In the last round 
on 15 December in southeast Aceh, GAM surrendered 
another 212 weapons. The Gol made a similar positive 
gesture by withdrawing more than 21 ,000 military and 
police from Aceh. The official figure provided for the with-
drawal of 25,221 soldiers and 4,700 policemen. The last 
batch of Indonesian military were due to leave Aceh by 29 
December. 
Disbanding the TNA 
The Helsinki agreement provided for GAM to demo-
bilise all its 3,000 combat troops. So far this has happened 
in an orderly fashion; the majority returned home and many 
were greeted by village people with open arms and even 
with festivities. This first step proceeded smoothly, but the 
next step, returning the ex-combatants to civilian life, will 
take more time, effort and thought. The official name of the 
armed wing of GAM was TNA (Tentara Nasional Aceh, 
National Army of Aceh). With the signing of the peace 
agreement, the TNA is to be disbanded by the end of the 
decommissioning period. 
TNA was first and foremost a guerrilla movement and 
had grown into a large movement by the end of the 1980s. 
At first, GAM focused much more on its role as a political 
movement in raising the consciousness of the Acehnese 
people. From 1986 to 1989, hundreds of Acehnese received 
military training in Libya. The present leadership of GAM 
and TNA consist largely of the 'Libya alumni' including 
Muzakkir Manaf, the present TNA commander-in-chief. 
GAM established a body called KPA (Komando 
Peralihan Aceh, the Aceh Transitional Command) to handle 
this complex task. The government in Jakarta has set up 
arrangements for former TNA combatants to enlist in the 
TNI or POLRI, the Indonesian Police, but it is unlikely that 
many TNA members will want to enter the ranks of their 
former enemy. 
As a way of ensuring future livelihoods, the Helsinki 
.talks included extensive provisions for the reintegration of 
the TNA combatants. If they hand over their weapons they 
are entitled to receive a house and a plot of land. They will 
also be given an opportunity to obtain job training as a way 
of improving their chances of returning to civilian life. The 
majority of TNA combatants are villagers with a low level 
of education. GAM's strength was always much more at the 
grass roots with very few hailing from the cities. It is clear 
that the vast majority of TNA combatants will need to go on 
upgrading courses to as to be able to function well in a 
democratic Aceh. 
Reintegrating the TNA 
While the MoU mentions 3,000 GAM combatants and 
another 2,000 GAM political prisoners, the reality is very 
different. If one includes networks in the villages plus the 
widows and childr,en of TNA combatants who have died, 
the figure rises to 22,000. 
It is not known how the Indonesian government or the 
IOM (International Organisation of Migration), the agency 
asked to facilitate the reintegration of GAM, will solve this 
problem. It is partly a matter of money (providing handouts 
and other facilities) but also the complex procedure of re-
entering civilian life. If this is not handled properly, it could 
become a major stumbling block in the peace process. 
Looking back, the TNA was a formidable fighting force. 
As a guerril1a movement, its structure was strongly decen-
tralised and Commander-in-Chief Muzakkir Manaf only 
functioned as commander of the local commanders. The 
local commanders had their own direct line to GAM's polit-
ical headquarters in Sweden and also received instructions 
from the GAM Minister of Defence Zakaria Saman, who 
was based in Thailand. 
Like other guerrilla movements, the TNA recruited from 
the villages but the majority of the combatants did not func-
tion as full-time guerrillas. Most lived at home and stayed 
with their wives or families. In that sense, most TNA 
combatants lived as civilians. During earlier negotiations 
which started in 2000, the armed struggle was seen by 
GAM as a means of strengthening their bargaining position 
with Jakarta. 
When the previous peace agreement broke down in 2003, 
a massive military operation was launched by the TNI. The 
population in the countryside suffered heavily and the TNA 
sustained heavy losses too. But after two years of military 
operations, it became clear to many TNI officers that a mili-
tary victory would never be achieved. Many circles in 
Jakarta drew the conclusion that only a negotiated settle-
ment could end the conflict. 
The acceptance by rank-and -file TNA warriors of a 
negotiated settlement, including the surrender of their arms 
was logical. It was the same kind of real-politik that ulti-
mately led to talks with Jakarta as the way to end the 
conflict. 
GAM as a political movement 
Arguably, the biggest challenge in present day Aceh is 
the transformation of GAM from a liberation movement 
into a political movement and eventually a political party. 
Hitherto GAM and its followers have always dealt with the 
Jakarta government in a confrontational way. 
The Helsinki agreement has changed all this. GAM is not 
an adversary any more and the former warring parties have 
become involved in implementing the peace process. GAM 
has set up its headquarters in a modest house in Banda Aceh 
and is gradually functioning as a normal political move-
ment. GAM leaders like lrwandi Yusuf, Ishak Daud and 
Bachtiar Abdullah are in daily contact with representatives 
from Jakarta and are preparing themselves for GAM's 
future as a political party. A new structure has been set up 
called Majelis Nasional (National Assembly) which is 
likely to function as a pre-parliament chaired by Teungku 
Usman Lampoh Awe, a senior GAM member who was 
released from prison after the peace accord was signed. This 
Majelis will act as the highest body to decide on political 
steps and prepare for the political transformation. It requires 
continued on page 14 
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Hope for a better future after the war 
and the waves 
The first anniversary of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami tragedy could be the last time the world [ocuses 
on Aceh. Despite promises that the world will not forget Aceh, it is likely that this anniversary will mark 
the beginning of the end of global attention onAceh. However the key toAceh'sfuture will lie in events 
unfolding throughout 2006. It could be the most important year in Aceh 's moaern history. 
The mandate of the international Aceh Monitoring 
Mission, AMM, comes to an end in 2006, and it is unlikely 
to be extended beyond then. This means that peace will be 
in the hands of the Acehnese and the Indonesians. 
Preparations for security arrangements in Aceh after the end 
of the AMM's mandate should start now. As locals will not 
be able to attend AMM offices to register their complaints, 
a new complaints commission should be established to 
replace AMM. 
Building trust takes time 
The Acehnese should be kept well informed about 
AMM's forthcoming departure so they can make prepara-
tions for the change. The building of trust between the 
Indonesian government and former GAM combatants will 
take time, and will need to be completed in the absence of 
ASEAN and European observers. 
Before the first ever direct local elections scheduled for 
May or June, the Indonesian parliament and government in 
Jakarta will have to consider a new law on the governance 
of Aceh to be submitted by the Acehnese. This law will be 
the turning point, the moment when an unhappy past can be 
replaced by a hopeful future. After more than 30 years of 
conflict involving thousands of deaths the future will 
depend on a single piece of legislation. 
Unfortunately, so far is not so good. Although the draft 
law may well be adequate, the process seems to have been 
monopolised by the Acehnese elite. A bad draft drawn up by 
means of a proper process is better than a good draft drawn 
up by a bad process; but it is unlikely that if things proceed 
well, a bad draft will result. 
More consultations needed 
The process needs to be strengthened by greater involve-
ment of the public and marginalised Acehnese groups, espe-
cially woman. As things are, there have been fewer public 
consultations than expected. The timeframe is important, 
but an overly tight deadline for submission of the draft has 
not been helpful. More time should have been allocated and 
more support provided for public consultations, especially 
to create a sense of public ownership of the process, 
contributing to the building of trust and hope. 
After the draft is approved, the elections will be the next · 
item on the agenda for 2006. These elections will hopefully 
be the freest ever held in Aceh. At this stage the main issue 
will be whether GAM and Acehnese civil society groups are 
able to take part in the electoral process; in the establish-
ment of local political parties, and the nomination of their 
own candidates without interference from Jakarta. While 
technically this will depend on whether the new legislation 
makes proper arrangements for democratic engagement, in 
practice it will depend on the maturity of all the parties in 
their involvement in the political process. 
Setting a precedent 
When push comes to shove, 2006 will show whether the 
armed conflict can really be transformed into a political, 
electoral battle with GAM and other Acehnese groups 
competing alongside national, Jakarta-based parties at the 
local level. If things proceed satisfactorily, this will set a 
precedent for building democracy in Aceh and could set a 
good example for the rest of Indonesia. 
And of course, 2006 will also be the year when post-
tsunami reconstruction can really be assessed. One year on, 
it will be possible to judge whether reconstruction is 
making good progress or is mired in chaos and confusion. 
The success or failure of the reconstruction work depends 
on whether the promises to the Acehnese people have been 
kept. 
Since the Aceh conflict seems now to have been finally 
resolved peacefully, no one can cite the conflict as an 
excuse for slow progress. As. peace has been restored, 
anything untoward with the reconstruction can be blamed 
on all those involved. All stakeholders are equally responsi-
ble: the international agencies, central and local govern-
ment and civil society groups. 
2006 should be the year when Acehnese can finally enjoy 
that better future which has been out of reach for so long. 
The fulfillment of Acehnese hopes will disarm their minds 
and make peace in their hearts. Even if some weapons are 
still buried in the mountains, this need not matter anymore. 
They will rot, unused, as the people of Aceh devote all their 
energies to building a new and better life, after the war and 
the waves. 
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The Foreign Office has countered by saying that the use 
by the Indonesian government 'within its O'Yfl borders of 
proportionate force to maintain law and order, subject to 
appropriate controls, is legitimate and does not constitute 
repression or a human rights abuse'. 
This 'law and order' justification deliberately ignores the 
context of West Papua in which human rights are routinely 
abused by security forces who cannot be trusted to use 
'proportionate force ' or exercise 'appropriate controls' . It 
also entails the disturbing consequence that British equip-
ment is being used to uphold laws - for example the law 
which makes it illegal to fly the Papuan 'Morning Star' flag 
- which are themselves flagrant breaches of fundamental 
rights. 
The Foreign Office says that without further evidence 
that the equipment is being used in what it regards as a 
repressive manner it cannot do anything. This is a familiar 
approach adopted over many years to defend accusations 
that British equipment was being used in East Timor and 
Aceh. In effect, the British government is saying that it will 
not do anything unless and until equipment is used to perpe-
trate human rights abuses. It will not intervene to prevent 
abuses taking place. 
'Assurances' worthless 
In the past, the Foreign Office's favourite tactic has been 
to rely on so-called Indonesian assurances that British 
equipment will not be used for internal repression or in 
violation of human rights. However in answer to a parlia-
mentary question on the water cannons, the government has 
continued from page 12 
a very different mindset for the GAM rank-and-file to func-
tion within the Indonesian system. 
The local elections which were scheduled for April but 
have been postponed till May or June, will be the first real 
test of GAM's strength and popularity among the Acehnese 
people. GAM representatives will be able to put themselves 
forward as independent candidates running for governor, 
mayor or district chiefs. The present administration in Aceh 
consists of Acehnese representing Indonesian political 
parties. The elected governor is in prison on corruption 
charges and technically, Aceh is run directly by the 
Department of the Interior in Jakarta. 
A draft law on the governance of Aceh drafted by 
Acehnese institutions will be discussed in the national 
parliament in Jakarta in February and March. The outcome 
of the discussion and the final version of the draft law will 
form the base of a new Aceh, along the lines of the Helsinki 
agreement. Although GAM did not officially take part in the 
drafting, there was certainly input from individual 
members. Some important aspects of the special autonomy 
of Aceh adopted in the post-Suharto period have been 
scrapped from the draft. There is no mention of Syari' ah 
law and the name given at the time to Aceh, Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam (NAD), has been shelved. 
Reconstruction post-tsunami 
While peace building is high on the agenda, the post 
tsunami reconstruction is also a top priority. The tsunami 
tragedy on Boxing Day 2004 ranks as one of the worst 
admitted that such assurances are unenforceable. TAPOL 
and other campaigne~s have always maintained that the 
assurances were worthless, but were persistently ignored. 
The government cynically used them to disregard the 
concerns of human rights groups and victims of Indonesian 
military violence so that British arms companies could 
continue with business as usual. 
While welcoming the official recognition that the assur-
ances have no value, TAPOL is deeply concerned that 
British government is not now prepared to prevent the use 
of British equipment in violation of human rights in West 
Papua or elsewhere. 
End-use monitoring failures 
This latest development has also exposed the inadequacy 
of procedures to monitor the end use of British equipment, 
such as they exist. Despite the fact that the British 
Embassy's human rights officer visited Jayapura in 
September, after the deployment of the water cannons, the 
Foreign stated in reply to another parliamentary question in 
November that it was not aware of any British equipment in 
West Papua. 
The government has admitted that no guidelines have 
been issued to embassy staff concerning the end-use moni-
toring of equipment. Instead, in further confirmation that 
its approach is entirely reactive, it has said that the core 
standing tasks of embassy staff include investigating after 
the event reports that equipment has been used to perpetrate 
human rights abuses. 
tragedies in the world, and Aceh was the hardest hit. 
According to a Red Cross report in June, 131,029 people 
were killed in Aceh and Nias and another 37,066 are miss-
ing, presumed dead. 
On paper around US$3.5 billion is pledged by the inter-
national community for the reconstruction of Aceh, but as 
with many natural disasters around the world, a large 
number of technical or bureaucratic delays or problems of 
corruption have hampered the speedy reconstruction of the 
tsunami-struck areas. 
Reconstruction and peace building are closely connected 
and the success or failure of reconstruction is tied to the 
peace building. Initially the official agency responsible for 
reconstruction, the BRR (Badan untuk Rekonstruksi dan 
Rekonsiliasi, Agency for the Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation) tried to keep a certain distance from the 
peace building process but very soon they realised that 
reconstruction in a conflict area like Aceh can only be 
successful if it is closely linked with the peace building 
process. 
Part of the destruction of the infrastructure of Aceh was 
manmade, including the destruction of public buildings and 
houses and will need to be an integral part of reconstruction 
of Aceh. In particular the reintegration of former GAM 
combatants needs careful coordination between BRR 
' AMM and the stakeholders, GAM and the Jakarta govern-
ment. 
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Truth and Reconciliation report on hold 
This month marks the 30th anniversary of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975. 
But despite years of suffering, the victims of the brutal occupation still await justice. An historic and 
long-awaited report by East Timor's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation has been 
completed, hut not yet made public. The report includes important recommendations on justice and 
the payment of compensation by western governments and arms companies. 
The UN-established Commission (known by its 
Portuguese-language acronym, CAVR) presented its 2,500-
page report to the President of East Timor, Xanana Gusmao, 
on 31 October 2005 after three years of painstaking work. 
The report provides the most detailed and comprehensive 
documentation of the human rights abuses committed by 
the Indonesian military and police and their militia proxies. 
It will be a crucial account of the truth about the widespread 
and systematic crimes committed during the occupation. 
Nearly 8,000 statements were taken from victims and 
witnesses and more than 1400 perpetrators gave evidence 
and participated in 216 community reconciliation events. 
It was expected that the CAVR report would be made 
public when it was handed over by the President to the 
national parliament on 28 November. However, that did not 
happen, prompting fears that parts of the report would be 
suppressed. In his speech to parliament, the President made 
clear his objections to key recommendations, but the CAVR 
has since insisted that the full report is now being prepared 
for release. 
TAPOL welcomes the completion of the report and pays 
tribute to those who participated in the process, especially 
the many victims still traumatised by their experiences. 
TAPOL is, however, concerned that the delay in publication 
is politically motivated and could further undermine the 
victims' search for justice. It has written to President 
Gusmao, calling for the immediate and widespread dissem-
ination of the report [see 
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/let051220 .htm]. 
In addressing parliament, the President - who has been 
strongly criticised for prioritising good relations with 
Indonesia over justice for his people - accused the commis-
sioners of 'grandiose idealism'. He suggested that true 
justice lay in the international community's recognition of 
East Timor's independence. In response to the CAVR's 
statement that 'the absence of justice .. .is a fundamental 
obstacle in the process of building a democracy', he said: 
'My reply to that would be "not necessarily'". 
President Gusmao opposed the Commission's recom-
mendation that justice should be pursued through a renewed 
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes in East Timor and objected to important recommen-
dations con~erning reparations for the victims. 
Up to 183,000 deaths · 
A preview of the report in the Straits Times newspaper 
says the CAVR estimates that 18,600 non-combatant East 
Timorese were killed or disappeared and at least 84,000 
more died from hunger and illness during the period 
covered by the CAVR's mandate (see below). It suggests 
that the overall death toll from conflict-related causes 
during the mandate period could be as high as 183,000 
[Juggling Pragmatic Politics with Bloody Past, Straits 
Times, 19 December 2005] [see footnote]. 
Crimes recorded ranged from 'mass executions to forced 
resettlements, sexual and other horrific forms of torture as 
well as abuse against children'. The internal conflict involv-
ing the left-wing Revolutionary Front of Independent 
Timor-Leste (Fretilin) and the rightist Timorese Democratic 
Union (UDT), which preceded Indonesia's 1975 invasion, 
also claimed around 3,000 lives of combatants and non-
conbatants. 
An estimated 42,000 Timorese were arbitrarily detained 
and 232 were convicted and sentenced to lengthy jail terms 
on subversion charges after sham political trials, according 
to the Straits Time~' preview. 
The CAVR finds that the violence and devastation visited 
on East Timor before and after the August 1999 indepen-
dence vote resulted from 'the execution of a systematic plan 
that was approved, conducted and controlled by Indonesian 
military commanders up to the highest level.' 
'Members of the civil administration of Timor Leste and 
national-level government officials, including ministers, 
knew of the strategy being pursued on the ground, and 
rather than taking action to halt it, directly supported its 
implementation,' it says. 
However, what happened before 1999 was much worse, 
says the report: 
'Egregious as they were, the crimes committed in 1999 
were far outweighed by those committed during the previ-
ous 24 years of occupation and cannot be properly under-
stood or addressed without acknowledging the truth of the 
long conflict.' 
As well as recommending the renewal of the SCU 
mandate, the CAVR says the UN Security Council should 
establish an international tribunal if 'other measures be 
deemed to have failed to deliver a sufficient measure of 
justice and Indonesia persists in the obstruction of justice'. 
It also calls upon UN member states to deny visas to 
Indonesian military officers named in the report for either 
human rights abuses or command responsibility for troops 
accused of violations. 
West must pay for its support 
According to The Times newspaper in the UK, the CA VR 
report addresses the question of reparations for victims, by 
saying: 
'The permanent members of the Security Council, partic-
ularly the US but also Britain and France, who gave military 
backing to the Indonesian Government between 197 4 and 
1999 and who are duty bound to uphold the highest princi- · 
pies of world order and peace and to protect the weak and 
vulnerable, (should) assist the Government of Timor-Leste 
in the provision of reparations to victims of human rights 
violations suffered during the Indonesian occupation' [West 
must pay for brutal occupation, The Times, 28 November 





'Business corporations that profited from the sale of 
weapons to Indonesia during the occupation of Timor-Leste 
(should) contribute to the reparations programme'. 
While the US was the leading supporter of Indonesia's 
annexation and occupation of East Timor, the UK provided 
critical diplomatic, political, and military support as 
recently declassified documents have revealed [see separate 
item: '25 years of betrayal']. 
The British company that derived the most profit from 
the sale of weapons to Indonesia was British Aerospace 
(now BAE Systems). Eight of the company's Hawk fighter 
jets were first sold to Indonesia in 1978. More orders for a 
total of 40 aircraft followed in the 1990s [see box]. 
Scorpion and Stormer armoured vehicles made by Alvis, 
and Tactica water cannon vehicles made by GKN-
subsidiary Glover Webb, were also sold. Both Alvis and 
GKN have since been absorbed into the BAE Systems 
conglomerate. 
CAVR mandate 
The CA VR was set up as an independent body by the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 
2001 and began work in 2002. Its purpose was to inquire 
into human rights violations committed on all sides between 
25 April 1974 (when the overthrow of the fascist Caetano 
regime in Portugal set in train the events which led to 
Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor) and 25 
October 1999 (when UNTAET was established to adminis-
ter the territory) and promote reconciliation between 
victims and perpetrators. 
The CA VR's mandate provided it with three main func-
tions: to seek the truth regarding human rights violations 
and establish a truth-telling mechanism for victims and 
perpetrators to describe, acknowledge and record past 
abuses; to facilitate community reconciliation in relation to 
lesser crimes and mediate between victims and perpetrators; 
and to make recommendations for further action on recon-
ciliation and the promotion of human rights. 
Justice denied 
So far the Timorese have been largely denied any form of 
meaningful justice. After much delay, an ad hoc human 
rights court was set up in Jakarta to try 18 defendants on 
crimes against humanity charges. The ensuing proceedings, 
which began in March 2002, were widely regarded as a 
travesty. Only one conviction still stands. 
In East Timor itself, a UN-backed process was estab-
lished comprising a Serious Crimes Unit and Special Panel 
for Serious Crimes. Both have now ceased work. The SCU 
filed 95 indictments against 391 individuals, many includ-
ing crimes against humanity charges. The indictments 
resulted in 75 convictions - mainly of lower-level East 
Timorese militia members - and three acquitals. Charges 
remain pending against 339 accused who remain at large 
outside the jurisdiction, mostly in Indonesia. Hundreds of 
cases have not been investigated or proceeded to indict-
ment. 
Earlier this year, a UN Commission of Experts recom-
mended that Indonesia be given the final opportunity to 
comply with its obligations to secure accountability for seri-
ous crimes committed in East Timor. Failing that it recom-
mended the establishment of an international tribunal. The 
Commission expressed grave reservation about a 
Major UK arms deals, 1975-1999 
April 1978 . 
British Aerospace signs a contract to supply Indonesia 
with eight Hawk Mk 53 ground attack/trainer aircraft 
valued at £25 million. Orders for a further twelve Hawk 
Mk 53s were placed between 1981 and 1983. 
June 1993 
Indonesia orders for eight 100 series advanced 
trainer/light attack Hawk aircraft and sixteen 200 series 
fighter aircraft worth £500 million. 
October 1994 
Jane's Defence Weekly reports that Indonesia is to 
purchase between 120 and 140 newly-built Alvis vehicles, 
including Scorpion 90 vehicles and Stormer armoured 
personnel carriers. A licence is issued to Alvis in March 
1995. 
February 1996 
Indonesia signs a contract for a further sixteen 200 series 
Hawks worth up to £300 million. The aircraft were deliv-
ered after Tony Blair's Labour government came to power 
in May 1997. It controversially refused to revoke the 
export licence despite promising an 'ethical dimension' to 
its foreign policy. 
December 1996 
An export licence is issued to Alvis for the export of 50 
Scorpion armoured vehicles worth £80 million and 'asso-
ciated equipment'. 
December 1996 
A further licence is issued to Procurement Services Ltd 
for seven Tactica water cannon vehicles made by the 
GKN-owned company, Glover Webb. Licences had 
earlier been issued for three and six water cannons in 
1994 and 1995. 
Commission of Truth and Friendship set up by the govern-
ments of Indonesia and East Timor, which does not enjoy 
public support in East Timor and includes terms of refer-
ence which contradict international standards on the denial 
of impunity [see TAPOLBulletin, No 179, p.11]. 
The UN Security Council has asked the Secretary-
General to prepare a report on justice and reconciliation for 
East Timor based of the recommendations of the 
Commission of Experts. It is to be hoped that this also takes 
into account the findings of the CAVR and that it is 
completed and acted upon with due urgency. 
Note: On 4 January 2006 the CAVR issued a statement 
correcting media 'misrepresentations' of its report. Where 
possible, the above article has been amended to reflect this 
statement. In relation to the death-toll estimate, the CAVR 
says: 'CAVR's estimate of the minimum total number of 
conflict-related deaths is 102,800 (+/- 12,000). This figure 
includes both killings and deaths due to privation. The 
figure of 183,000 is CAVR's upper-bound estimate of total 
conflict-related mortality. Conflict-related mortality 
includes (a) killings and disappearances and (b) deaths due 
to hunger and illness ("deprivation") which exceed the total 
that would be expected if the death rate due to hunger and 
illness had continued as it was in the pre-invasion peace-
time period. 
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25 years of betrayal 
Political events on the half island of East Timor were front-page news in 1999 when the population 
overwhelmingly voted/or independence in a UN-sponsored vote. But as usual, nothing was said about 
the way in which the west - especially the US, Europe and Australia - betrayed East Timor by its 
SlfJ!POrtfor the invasion and occupation by the Indonesian military in December 1975. Recently declas-
sijted documents in the public archives of Washington and London reveal that the invasion took place 
with the knowledge and approval of Washington, Canberra and London. 
Next to the anti-Apartheid issue, the campaign for justice 
and the right to self-determination in East Timor was 
arguably the biggest campaign on the international agenda 
in the nineties. As with the anti-Apartheid movement, East 
Timor solidarity erupted in all parts of the world, increasing 
the pressure on the dictatorial Suharto regime in Jakarta. 
The history of East Tim or since 197 5 is a unique example 
in international politics where direct action, campaigning, 
lobbying and pressure on governments made it possible to 
create the opportunity for a UN-sponsored referendum. 
The Indonesian invasion was the beginning of a long and 
bloody occupation that cost up to 183,000 East Timorese 
lives [see separate article 'Truth and Reconciliation report 
on hold']. The invasion took place only months after the 
defeat of the Americans in Indochina and the spectre of 
communism provided the guideline for policy makers in 
Washington, London and Canberra. In Cold War terms, 
Indonesia was politically a safe haven, with Suharto, a 
staunch anti-communist, in charge in Jakarta. 
Economically, Indonesia was at that time a primary source 
for minerals; the largest oil producer in Asia and the largest 
gas exporter in the world. 
Declassified documents 
As a result of the efforts of the National Security Archive 
in Washington, using the Freedom of Information Act, 
previously classified documents were released. More than 
1, 000 documents were ultimately obtained, a total of nearly 
4,500 pages. Staff and researchers of the National Security 
Archive also acquired other important material on East 
Timor from the Nixon, Ford and Carter presidential 
libraries. 
A similar effort was made in the UK by independent 
researcher Hugh Dowson using the UK's Freedom of 
Information Act which came into force in 2005. Despite 
requests from Dowson to open all the files for the period 
from 1975, documents for the period 1998 to 1999 have 
been refused under national security exemptions. More than 
31 documents were released on 28 November, the day East 
Timorese President Xanana Gusmao transmitted the final 
report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation to the East Timor parliament [see separate 
article]. 
The US documents 
The NSA postings reveal a consistent pattern by succes-
sive US administrations of undermining East Timor's right 
to self determination, despite ten resolutions at the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council. It also reveals that 
Washington was aware oflndonesia's intention to take East 
Timor by force far earlier than previously recognised and 
was fully aware of credible reports of ongoing Indonesian 
atrocities in East Timor from 1975 until 1983 and turned a 
blind eye to the extensive use of US weapons in East Timor. 
Two reports were posted by. the NSA on meetings between 
President Gerald Ford (accompanied by Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger) and President Suharto. The first meeting 
took place on 5 July 1975 in Camp David during Suharto's 
visit to the US. While both Ford and Kissinger were still 
traumatised by the events in Vietnam, Suharto argued that 
those who were seeking independence in East Timor were 
'communist-influenced'. The dictator argued that indepen-
dence for East Timor was not a viable option while integra-
tion with Portugal would be too heavy a burden for that 
country. Suharto cautiously raised the issue of Indonesia 
using violence: 'I want to assert that Indonesia doesn't want 
to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the prob-
lem is how to manage the self-determination process with a 
majority wanting unity with Indonesia'. 
At their next meeting in Jakarta on 6 December 1975, the 
day before the Indonesian invasion, Suharto again raised the 
dilemma of East Timor and asked the US President for his 
understanding for an imminent invasion. The conversation 
was as follows: · 
Suharto: 'It is now important to determine what we can 
do to establish peace and order for the present and future in 
the interest of the security of the area and Indonesia. These 
are some of the considerations we are now contemplating. 
We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take 
rapid or drastic action'. 
Gerald Ford: 'We will unqerstand and will not press you 
on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the 
intentions you have.' 
Henry Kissinger: was concerned ' .... that whatever you 
do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the 
reaction in America if whatever happens after we return. 
This way there would be less chance of people talking in an 
unauthorised way. The President will be back on Monday at 
2:00 pm Jakarta time. We understand your problem and the 
need to move quickly but I am only saying that it would be 
better if it were done after we returned'. 
The Ford administration knew from the start that 
Indonesia launched its invasion almost entirely with US 
weapons and that the use of this equipment was illegal. A 
week after the invasion, a detailed report of the invasion 
was prepared by the National Security Council. A US-
supplied destroyer shelled East Timor during the attack, 
Indonesian marines disembarked using US landing craft. C-
47 and C-130 aircraft dropped Indonesian paratroops and 
strafed the capital Dili with .50 calibre machine guns. It is 
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also evident that most of the training of Indonesian combat 
troops was undertaken by US trainers. 
Long, bloody war with US weapons 
Soon after the invasion, which was supposed to be 
speedy and smooth, it became clear that the Indonesian 
troops were facing strong resistance. Four months after the 
invasion, Chief of Staff of the US Pacific Fleet, Lt. General 
Moore, met Indonesian Defence Ministry Assistant for 
Planning Major General Yoga Supardi who warned that 
Indonesian troops were encountering 'a serious drain on 
resources, with shortages of ammunition for small arms 
artillery, tank and naval guns. Indonesia stressed the urgent 
need for helicopters, communications equipment and 
ammunition of all types. 
On 14 June 1977 National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski wrote a memo to President Carter urging him to 
approve an increase in economic assistance to the Suharto 
regime, to ease conditions for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
of US weapons and 'ease up on the human rights pressures 
directed at Indonesia' . 
On 9 May 1978, shortly before the visit of Vice President 
Walter Mondale to Jakarta, a request was made for the 
accelerated approval for the sale of sixteen A-4 fighter jets 
to J~karta. On the arrival of Mondale in Jakarta on 9 May, 
President Carter issued a special Presidential Guidance 
approving the sale. 
On 14 September 1978, US ambassador Ed Masters trav-
elled to East Timor and filed a report to the State 
Department. He warmly praised Indonesian efforts in 
Timor, claiming the military presence had been much 
reduced, movement was free, refugees were being taken 
care of, and Indonesia was devoting itself to the economic 
development of the region. 
It should be noted that this stage-managed visit came at 
the tail end of a vicious military campaign called 'annihila-
tion and encirclement', forcing relocation of the majority of 
the countryside population to resettlement camps. 
Most of the posted NSA documents reveal a similar 
thrust: the US embassy in Jakarta was fully aware of the 
continuing military operations in the late seventies and the 
major Operasi Keamanan in May 1981 which involved the 
forced recruitment of thousands of Timorese who were 
made to walk across large parts of the territory in the hope 
of flushing out Falintil guerrillas. 
Only after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 or more 
specificly after the Clinton administration took office, was 
there a gradual shift towards pressure on the Indonesian 
government on human rights conditions in East Timor 
UK lied about East Timor invasion 
The newly released UK documents reveal that the British 
government knowingly lied about Indonesian atrocities, 
including the killing of British journalists in 197 5. Most of 
the documents are telegrams between the British embassy 
in Jakarta and the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office). 
A series of telegrams in October 1975, two months prior 
to the invasion, reveal the detailed knowledge British and 
Australian embassies in Jakarta already had on the immi-
nent invasion. In early October Indonesian troops began 
launching cross-border raids into East Tirnor from West 
Timor hoping to provoke a response that could justify a full 
scale invasion. 
On 16 October the FCO informed key British embassy 
officials in Jakarta that the Cabinet Office Assessments 
Staff had learned in 'confidence' from Britain's Joint 
Intelligence Committee representative in Canberra, that 
'Indonesia intends soon to intervene covertly in strength' in 
East Timar. Three days earlier, Harry Tjan Silalahi from the 
influential Jakarta-based think-tank CSIS with close links to 
Indonesian intelligence, told Australian embassy officials 
that 'the main thrust' of the covert operation would begin on 
15 October. On 16 October, one day after the date 
mentioned, two British journalists and three other newsmen 
were killed in Balibo, inside East Timor, during the covert 
operation. 
John ' Ford, Britain's ambassador in Jakarta since June 
1975, had already concluded that the invasion was 
inevitable and launched a cover-up operation. On 24 
October he wrote a top secret telegram saying: 'The 
American ambassador said... Timar was high on 
Kissinger's list of places where the US do not want to 
comment or get involved. I am sure we should continue to 
follow the American model.' The ambassador continued to 
lie and on 24 December 1975, three weeks after the inva-
sion, he wrote in a secret telegram to London saying that the 
invading forces had gone 'on a rampage of looting and 
killing' but added: 'If asked to comment on any stories of 
atrocities, I suggest we say that we have no information.' 
The ambassador was determined to 'bury' the issue of the 
killing of the five journalists, nowadays better known as the 
Balibo Five and blame them for being 'in the war zone of 
their own choice'. ~n a telegram dated 24 October Ford said: 
'We have suggested to the Australians that, since we know 
what happened to the newsmen, it is pointless to go on 
demanding information from the Indonesians which they 
cannot, or are unwilling to provide.'. 
The cover-up operation on the brutalities of the 
Indonesian invasion continued relentlessly in the interna-
tional arena at a time when Britain was president of the 
United Nations Security Council. The British managed to 
'keep the heat out of the Timor business' at the UN highest 
level to the extent that the statement of condemnation in the 
UN was relatively mild. In February 1976 Murray Simons, 
head of the South-east Asia Department at the FCO wrote 
that 'the Indonesians were evidently much gratified at the 
way in which the British delegation took account of their 
interests and considered that the language was one they 
could well live with'. 
It is often argued that in the end, East Timor won its inde-
pendence thanks to intervention by the international 
community. This is only part of the story. The many lies, the 
d?uble sta.ndards ~d unstinting support for a brutal military 
dictatorship are evidence of the blatant complicity of west-
ern governments in the tragedy of Indonesia's invasion and 
occupation of East Timar. 
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Munir Inurder trial fails to expose 
masterininds 
The trial and conviction of a man involved in the conspiracy to murder human rights activist Munir 
has failed to identify the individual and agencies who plotted the murder. Meanwhile, pressure is grow-
ing for the President to make public the report of the Fact-Finding Team (TPF) which investigated the 
murder. Sixty-eight members of the US Congress have called for its publication and Munir 's widow, 
Suciwati, has renewed her demand for publication. A court in Jakarta sentenced a Garuda pilot to 
fourteen years for the murder. 
There is every reason to believe 
that the President is reluctant to reveal 
the contents of the report because it 
would bring to light the role of high~ 
ranking officials in the murder of 
Munir. Speaking at a meeting in Hong 
Kong recently on one of her many 
tours abroad to generate support for 
more openness in Indonesia regarding 
the murder, Suciwati said the role of 
high-ranking officials would become 
clear from the contents of the report. 
She also called for a performance 
review of police investigations and 
the creation of a new investigation 
team composed of representatives of 
Indonesian NGOs and officials from 
the Indonesian foreign ministry. 
It is widely believed that the charg-
ing of an off-duty Garuda ·pilot, 
Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto, with 
premeditated murder, will foreclose ===~~~= 
further investigations and leave the Demonstration about the murder of Munir 
matter to rest. Few doubt that . . . 
p l rt f th · cannot be taken senously. As Suc1wat1 has 
o ycarpus was P~ . 0, e conspiracy said on many occasions, why should a 
that led to the activists death because ·i t d "d h" t k"ll M · fl 
of his repeated phone calls to the PI oh eflc.1 e ?n Is own ° 1 umr or 
· h Id h l b ./.'. sue a 1msy reason. Mumr house o s ort y eiore M · d" d f l thal d f 
. . . unir 1e o a e ose o Munir started on his fateful Journey to · · d h" 
Th N h 1 d b d G d fl . ht arsemc added to the dnnk serve to 1m at e et er an s a oar aru a 1g f h" · h 
974 7 S t b 2004 H the commencement o is Journey to T e on ep em er . owever h 1 d w· h" h h · P 11 ' l"nk "th th I d · Net er an s. it m ours, e was vom1t-o ycarpus 1 s w1 e n ones1an · · I 1 h · ft d d" d 
· 11· BIN h dl mg v10 ent y on t e aircra an 1e two 
state mt~ igence. agency, . ' ar . Y hours before the plane reached its destina-
figured m the tnal, nor did the tnal tion. It was Pollycarpus who persuaded 
reveal ~he true re_ason f ~r the care- Munir to move from economy class to a 
fully-laid plot to kill Munir. seat in business class which is where he 
{\lleged motive unconvinc-
1ng 
Soon after it was announced that 
Polly~arpus would be tried for the 
murder, Suciwati, along with 
Herawati, the wife of Pollycarpus, 
publicly urged him to expose the true motive of t~e murder 
and reveal the identity of those involved, but he failed to do 
so, possibly fearing for his life. The indictment which 
alleged that 'as a staunch nationali~t', the def~ndant 
regarded Munir as an obstacle to the 1mplementat1on of 
government programmes, 'and wanted him eliminated', 
was served the fatal drink. 
After the verdict was announced, 
S.uciwati and several human rights groups 
,..,.,,,,"'..... said they would continue their efforts to 
expose the people who had given orders 
for Munir to be killed. Suciwati said the 
verdict had failed to provide answers. 
'Who was the real puppet-master?' she asked. 'This is what 
the police should be looking at now.' 
A member of the Indonesian Parliament's Commission 
III said after the verdict that Indonesia's chief of police, 
Police General Sutanto, had told the Commission that the 
intelligence agency, BIN had not been co-operative with the 
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police over this case. He said that since the presiding judge 
said that Pollycarpus had acted with others, it meant that 
there was a conspiracy. The MP, Benny K. Hannan, said 
that the police should investigate not only the role of BIN 
but also that of Garuda and another aviation company, PT 
Angkasa Pura. 
Speaking on behalf of the human rights organisation 
PBHI, Hendardi, who was a member of the TPF before its 
dissolution last June, again insisted that the President 
should make public the report drawn up by the Fact-Finding 
Team, and should also set up a Presidential Team with more 
powers than the TPF. 'This team should work alongside the 
police to bring to light the perpetrators who are hiding 
behind powerful political forces or others such as BIN.' 
[Suara Pembaruan, 27 December 2005] 
_Explaining the verdict, presiding judge, Cicut Sutiarso, 
said the only conspiracy the panel of judges could identify 
was that between the defendant acting in concert with crew 
members who served the drink. 
The judges drew attention to the fact that before and after 
the flight, Pollycarpus communicated frequently with a 
senior BIN official. BIN has denied any involvement in the 
crime and no action has been taken against anyone in the 
agency. 
After the verdict, Pollycarpus said he would appeal the 
verdict and once again rejected all the charges. 
A conspiracy 
The central argument of the Fact-Finding Team's unpub-
lished report is known to have been that Munir's murder 
was the result of a conspiracy. The Team was set up by 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono shortly before the 
end of 2004 in response to the nationwide outcry and 
demands for the murder to be thoroughly investigated. The 
Team was given a six-month mandate and presidential 
instructions were given at the time for all public officials 
and institutions to co-operate with the Team. This makes it 
all the more surprising that SBY, as the President is known, 
has not yet made the report public. One can only conclude 
that the Fact-Finding Team's conclusions were far more 
revealing of the truth than the President had thought possi-
ble. 
Usman Hamid, the secretary of the Team, has gone on 
record repeatedly to insist that the police investigations 
should not end with Pollycarpus. He is reported by The 
Jakarta Post [2 December 2005] as urging that the police 
follow through the Team's conclusion that the murder of the 
activist was the result of a criminal conspiracy. 
Speaking after attending a hearing of the Pollycarpus 
trial in Jakarta on 1 December, Usman said: 'It involved 
certain people from Garuda and BIN (the National 
Intelligence Agency).' Usman who now heads Kontras, the 
Commission for the Disappeared and the Victims of 
Violence, one of several human rights organisations set up 
by Munir, urged SBY and the national police to pursue the 
case until it is completely solved. 'If the related parties are 
not prosecuted, it will later become our demand. We are 
truly asking the national police and the prosecution to take 
steps to follow (our Report) up,' he said. 
Stri~e at British security 
company 
The well-known British security company Group 4 
Securicor (G4S) is being targeted by an international 
trade-union campaign partly because of its behaviour 
towards its Indonesian workforce. In April 2005, over 
500 out of 800 .Securicor guards in Jakarta went on strike 
when the company refused to pay a compensation pack-
age relating to the corporate merger with Group 4. As of 
early December, 238 remained on strike. 
The company has sacked 203 guards, claiming the strike 
to be illegal. The strikers and their families report Police 
harassment, with an attempt to charge them with 'insult-
ing behaviour' under Article 310 of the Criminal Code. 
Yet the National Tripartite Dispute Resolution 
Committee (P4P) - in a welcome ruling on the side of 
workers - declared the strike legal and all strikers terqii-
nated by G4S should be rehired. P4P said the company 
had failed to provide a legal plan and explanation, as 
required prior to mass redundancies. The P4P decision 
has been upheld by the Indonesian High Court. 
Among other grievances, G4S guards report shifts of 12 
hours, entailing forced overtime of four hours per day, in 
violation of Indonesian law. The law also requires 
employers to provide a meal during the night shift but 
the guards only get a chocolate bar. 
A representative of the ASPEK trade union from 
Indonesia was among those in London in June 2005 to 
put pressure on the G4S Annual General Meeting. For 
more on the international campaign, see www.focu-
songroup4securicor.org 
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teachers than elsewhere in Indonesia, conditions from 
district to district vary greatly. The unequal distribution of 
these resources limits access to education in certain parts of 
the province. 
While these indicators suggest that things are not too 
bad, the report goes on to quote a university lecturer in 
Jayap.ura (obviously an Indonesian, not a Papuan) who 
explams why so few Papuans complete their university 
education: 
'Actually, universities in Papua are providing a lot of 
opportunities for native Papuan students. We provide schol-
arships and other types of funding assistance. We even 
lowered our standard just to be able to accept more ethnic 
Papuans. But it is difficult to keep them in the classroom. 
Some of them cannot follow the lecture since they are way 
b~hind the others. No matter how hard we try to help them, 
sttll they cannot catch up. It is not entirely their fault. Once 
I aske? ~~em w~y t
1
hey could not do simple multiplication 
and. d1v1s1on. D1dn t they learn it in secondary schools? 
The tr answers were, how could we learn proper math if the 
teachers were never around to teach us? That's why most of 
them drop out of the university because they cannot follow 
the course.' 
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US restores military ties with 
Indonesia 
On 22 November, the Bush Administration _swept aside a bipartisan Congressional consensus and 
exploited a 'national security waiver' to restore full ties with the Indonesian military, TNL Congress 
had voted to make foreign military financing (with an exception for the navy) and sales of lethal 
weapons conditional on improvements in the TNI's grim record of reform, human rights and justice. 
Restrictions under various forms had been US policy since the first BushAdministration,following the 
world-wide outcry over the massacre of peace/ ul demonstrators at Santa Cruz cemetery in East Tim or 
in 1991. 
By issuing a waiver less than two days after the restric-
tions became law and with no known change in the security 
environment of either the US or Indonesia, the Bush admin-
istration undermined Congress's vital call for reform of a 
repressive military and debased the value of such waivers. 
This abuse of the national security waiver will not enhance 
US security. Rather it surrenders essential US leverage and 
empowers the 1NI to continue to violate human rights with 
impunity and ultimately threatens democracy in a key US 
ally. 
Earlier this year, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
authorised the resumption of International Military and 
Educational Training (IMET), a small but symbolically 
important part of the military relationship between the two 
countries [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 178, p. 14]. 
Ironically, the resumption of full-scale assistance coin-
cides with the release of extensive documentation of an 
earlier U.S. decision to set aside human rights concerns. 
The National Security Archive recently made public declas-
sified government documents which reveal the collusion of 
previous US administrations with the Suharto dictatorship 
to support the Indonesian military in its 1975 invasion and 
occupation of East Timor [see separate article, '25 years of 
betrayal']. Those documents also make clear that the US 
has sought to keep the tragic consequences of that dark 
period from Congress and the public at large. 
TNI a rogue institution 
Indonesia's democratic progress since the 1998 fall of 
Suharto does not negate the fact that the 1NI remains a 
rogue institution. Indeed, such progress has occurred 
despite the military. Relying on off-budget cash flows for 
up to 70 percent of its funding, the 1NI is only occasionally 
responsible to the civilian authorities. That cash flow 
includes many illegal ventures such as drug running, people 
trafficking, illegal logging, and extortion of domestic and 
foreign businesses. 
The military continues to be blatantly unaccountable for 
decades of human rights violations. In 1965-67, it conspired 
with Islamic militias to slaughter at least 500,000 civilians. 
Indonesia's invasion and quarter-century occupation of East 
Timor killed up to 183,000 Timorese. Military oP,erations 
in West Papua, which Indonesia annexed through a 1969 
referendum widely viewed as fraudulent, have cost the lives 
of tens of thousands. Military operations in Aceh for nearly 
three decades killed over 10,000. 
Throughout this period, the US maintained a close rela-
tionship with the 1NI that undeniably failed to lead to any 
democratic reform. The US steadfastly provided weapons 
systems to a force that used them against civilians and never 
faced a foreign foe. The US also maintained extensive train-
ing programs for what Washington deemed a reliable cold 
war ally. Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union, gener-
ous support for Suharto's military continued. The US 
Congress finally objected to the executive's unwavering 
backing when confronted with indisputable media coverage 
in 1991 after Indonesian-troops shot over 270 East Timorese 
at Santa Cruz cemetery. 
Restrictions on assistance tightened further in 1999 after 
the Indonesian military and its militias ravaged East Timor 
in response to a UN-administered pro-independence vote. 
More than 1,400 civilians were murdered and three-quarters 
of the country's infrastructure destroyed. Six years on, not 
one Indonesian officer has been held accountable for these 
crimes against humanity. 
In waiving Congressional restrictions, the Administration 
argued that unfettered assistance to the 1NI was needed to 
secure Indonesia's partnership in the war on terror. 
However, extensive anti-terror assistance programmes were 
already in place. Furthermore, this approach ignores the 
military's extensive cooperation with militias which have 
terrorised local populations. These include Islamic funda-
mentalist thug groups such as Laskar Jihad which, in 1999-
2001 with military backing, killed several thousands in the 
Maluku islands. The Administration has also failed to 
understand that terrorism iri Indonesia manifests itself as a 
police problem, with small cells rather than large roving 
armed bands. 
The Administration should seriously consider retracting 
the national security waiver and instead maintain prudent 
restrictions on the Indonesian military. In the meantime, 
Congress should exercise its oversight of the executive and 
call Secretary of State Rice to Capitol Hill to testify about 
this apparent breach of faith and obvious bad policy. 
This article was written by Ed McWilliams, a retired US 
Senior Foreign Service Officer who served as Political 
Counsellor at the US Embassy in Jakarta in the late 
1990s. 
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Media regulations undermine freedom of information 
New regulations restricting public access to information have been introduced to a wave of criticism 
from the media and civil society. The government is focusing on foreign broadcasting which is very 
popular throughout the country. Commentators have described this as turning back the clock to the 
days of Sukarno who called on Indonesians not to listen to western broadcasts. 
In a surprise move, the government of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, which took office in October 2004 after an 
election hailed as the most democratic election in the coun-
try since 1955, issued regulations prohibiting private broad-
cast stations from relaying news transmitted by foreign 
media. This means that Indonesians will no longer be able 
to listen to the Voice of America's Indonesian language 
service, which is at present being relayed by an estimated 
160 private radio stations. BBC broadcasts currently 
relayed by 86 stations will also be out of bounds, as will 
Radio Australia, Deutsche Wereld, and Radio Hilversum. 
The restrictions are likely to apply also to Kabelvision and 
Indovision which broadcast many foreign television 
stations, including the ABC, BBC, CNN, Fox News and 
CNBC among others. 
Article 17 (Sa) of the Government Regulation on Private 
Broadcasting, signed into law by the President on 
November 16, states: 'Private Broadcasting Institutions are 
forbidden to relay regular broadcast programmes originat-
ing from foreign broadcasting institutions which 
include .. . news, music programmes with improper perfor-
mances and sports broadcasts which show sadistic acts.' The 
regulation also places a ban on night time listening, appar-
ently in order to save energy. The regulation means that no 
one in Indonesia will be allowed to listen to news from 
abroad, and will be forced to listen only to locally broadcast 
news. 
How repressive can they get? 
Indonesia's leading English daily, The Jakarta Post, 
writes: 'The new regulation does not limit news 
programmes regularly relayed by local radio stations. It 
bans them entirely. One then may ask, how repressive can 
this government get?' [Jakarta Post, 5 December 2005] 
In a biting comment, the newspaper laments the fact that 
the new powers of the Department of Communications and 
Information is a reincarnation of the repressive Department 
of Information during the days of the dictator, Suharto. 
By boosting the powers of the Communications and 
Information Department, the new government regulation 
has usurped the powers of the Independent Broadcasting 
Commission (KPI) established under the Broadcasting Law 
of 2002 which defined it as an independent regulatory body 
similar to regulatory bodies that exist in many western 
countries. 
Local community stations furious 
The new regulation infuriated local community radios 
which are a popular source of local news in many parts of 
the country. Community radio operators in West Sumatra 
called for the revision of many aspects of the new regula-
tion, in particular a rule on the use oflndonesian as the main 
language of broadcast. They also objected to the licensing 
powers now being in the hands of the Minister instead of the 
KPI. One stipulation requires broadcasting stations to limit 
their radius to 2.5 kilometres. Speaking for the West 
Sumatra Community Radio Network, Nurhayati Kahar 
said: 'In remote areas where people are dispersed over a 
wide area such as in Papua or West Sumatra, the radius is 
clearly unworkable and will complicate licensing proce-
dures.' She also said that a distinctive feature of traditional 
community radio was the use of the local vernacular. The 
new regulation would undoubtedly prevent community 
stations from attracting local audiences. [The Jakarta Post, 
20 December] 
In another comment three days earlier, The Jakarta Post 
described the present government as 'the most aggressive 
against "this messenger" among the four governments after 
Suharto'. Apart from the four presidential regulations on 
foreign, private and community broadcasting, it has also 
introduced two ministerial decrees cutting electronic media 
airtime and the need for prepaid card users to register them-
selves with cellular operators. Another regulation believed 
to be in the pipeline will probably regulate the use of the 
Internet. 
Parliamentary discontent 
The new broadcasting rules have not gone down at all 
well with the Indonesian Parliament. An announcement in 
Parliament by the government made early in December that 
implementation of the regulation would be postponed was 
greeted with cheers and jeers in the gallery. The postpone-
ment was apparently intended to amend some ambiguities 
in the regulation. The House urged the government to lift 
the ban on night-time listening, which applies to all local 
broadcasters. 
This major assault on broadcasting is widely seen as a 
major threat to freedom of information which is recognised 
as one of the most important :freedoms in any democracy. 
Maluku radio station forced to close 
In a separate development, the district head of Southeast 
Maluku Regency revoked the broadcasting licence of 
Gelora Tavlul Radio on 14 December. The station is the 
largest private radio station in Southeast Maluku, apart from 
Radio Republik Indonesia and is popular for its critical 
reporting, particularly of local government. Around 20,000 
people rely on the station for their news and information. 
The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and its 
Indonesian affiliate, Aliansi Jurnalis Independent (AJI) are 
calling for the licence to be reinstated and for a legal guar-
antee to protect the broadcasting activities of the station. 
"The Southeast Maluku Regent is attempting to silence 
dissenting voices across the regency" said the IFJ. 
It pointed out that this intervention in the public's right to 
know contravenes article 28 of the Indonesian Constitution 
and Press Law no. 40/1999. 
"Without. a well informed and engaged public, true 
democracy is unable to flourish and survive," it said [IFJ 
statement 19 December 2005]. 
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Beheadings in Poso threaten 
communal relations 
At the end of October 2005, a particularly gruesome atrocity occurred in Poso, Central Sulawesi, with 
the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls on their way to school. The district with a fairly evenly 
divided community between Christians and Muslims has been the locus of terrorist actions for several 
years. Although the intention was almost certainly to re-ignite a conflict dating back to 2000, local 
leaders managed to prevent retaliatory strikes. 
On the morning of 29 October, as four schoolgirls were 
making their way to school along a path in the forest, they 
were stopped and attacked by a group of five or six hooded 
men on motorbikes. The men viciously attacked the four 
girls, beheading three of them and seriously wounding the 
fourth who managed to flee the scene of the crime with 
blood streaming from her head. 
Unlike most other parts of Indonesia where Muslims are 
in the majority, the population of Poso in Central Sulawesi 
is fairly evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, as 
is most of the island of Sulawesi. To the east lies Maluku, 
where Christians predominate and where inter-communal 
strife occurred for several years after the fall of the dictator, 
Suharto, until a peace agreement was brokered by Jusuf 
Kalla, now Indonesia's vice-president. 
After two years of inter-communal strife in Poso district 
as well as in nearby Palu, the capital of Central Sulawesi, a 
peace accord was signed in December 2001. By then, it was 
estimated that more than one thousand people had lost their 
lives. 
Although there have been many atrocities perpetrated 
during the conflict, in market places, in the vicinity of 
churches, at Muslim educational centres and in other public 
places, the gruesomeness of this attack was clearly designed 
to attract national and international attention and to inflame 
passions in the locality. Certain forces appear intent upon 
stirring up a conflict, perhaps with the objective of 
destablilising Indonesia's democratically elected govern-
ment. 
The victims were identified as Yarni Sambue (15) 
Interesia Morangke (16) and Alfita Paulina (19). The 
survivor's name is Noviana Malewa who was treated in 
intensive care at a nearby hospital. 
The bodies of the three girls were left at the site of the 
attack near a cocoa plantation. The heads were found at 
separate locations two hours later by residents. One of the 
heads was found near a church. 
Other atrocities 
Although the peace agreement signed in December 2001 
resulted in several years of relative calm, there have been a 
number of killings since May 2005. In May, two bombs 
exploded in a crowded market in Tentena, some 60 kilo-
metres south of Poso, killing at least 22 people and wound-
ing around forty. . 
Then in August, a few days before the 60th anmversary 
of Indonesia's national day on 17th August, two men were 
~hot dead. Another deadly attack occurred in Palu on New 
Year's Eve which killed seven people and injured many 
more. The incident occurred at a market where people were 
busy shopping in preparation for celebrations to welcome 
the New Year. 
Special military command set up 
In the wake of that incident, the government in Jakarta 
announced that it wpuld set up a Security Operations 
Command (Koopskarn) to deal with the crisis, but local 
NGOs opposed the move, saying this could pave the way 
for military-style operations. They stressed the need for the 
police to handle the situation and called for a fact-finding 
team to be established to investigate the series of atrocities 
in Poso and Palu. 
Usman Hamid, coordinator of Kontras, the Commission 
for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence, said it was 
time for the President to shake up the National Intelligence 
Agency (BIN). 'The latest bombing in Palu is more strong 
evidence of BIN's failure to perform its duty. It would be 
wrong if the President just ordered the institution to search 
for those responsible for the bombing. He has to replace the 
BIN officials with some capable people,' Usman said, the 
day after the latest atrocity in Central Sulawesi. 
He said that the market explosion in Palu was connected 
to a bombing in May at a market in Tentena. 'There have 
been reports that a group called Tim Bunga (Flower Team) 
is linked to the two attacks. The government must encouage 
the police to get to the bottom of this,' he said. Human rights 
groups do not believe that the bombings in Poso and Palu 
and in other parts of Central Sulawesi have anything to do 
with religion. 'The violence has been orchestrated by a 
certain group to deter the police,' said Usman. 
Local issues to.blame 
Commenting to the BBC's correspondent, Rachel 
Harvey, Sidney Jones who is regarded as the leading 
specialist on terrorism in Indonesia discounted the idea that 
these incidents were inspired by events in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. 'People join terrorist movements because of 
local issues,' she said, 'not because of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The best way to prevent further terrorist activity in 
Indonesia is to make sure that communal tensions between 
Christians and Muslims are well handled.' 
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number of armed Indonesian soldiers attempted to forcibly 
remove one of the UN team, Marshall Williams, from the 
compound because he was black and resembled a Papuan. 
Pelletier's memories of the act of free choice itself -
which, against the advice of Ortiz Sanz, was in the form of a 
traditional Indonesian musyawarah consultation, involving 
1,022 selected representatives out of a population of around 
700,000 - was of a series of meetings in the presence of non-
uniformed military personnel in which the participants were 
told to raise their hands and all duly obliged. Normal elec-
tion procedures were not followed. The 'vote' took place in 
an incongruous carnival atmosphere, with Indonesian flags 
everywhere. Papuans, who were normally naked, were 
bizarrely dressed in smart shorts and shirts, recalls Pelletier, 
who witnessed the event in the highland town of Wamena. 
Most election experts would agree that the implausible 100 
per cent vote for inclusion in Indonesia is in itself evidence 
that the process was a fraud. 
The UN team was made to leave West Papua and 
Indonesia as soon as the vote was over. Pelletier had wanted 
to take a short break in Bali, but was not allowed to stay on. 
He remains deeply unhappy about the way the process 
was conducted. His memory of similar processes in other 
countries was of long lines of people queuing to vote, being 
intent on expressing their views and being allowed to do so. 
Recently retired, Pelletier worked for the UN for over 30 
years and served in Africa, Asia, and South America, but 
says he never experienced anything like the Act of Free 
Choice, before or since. 
Undoubtedly, the UN's conduct in relation to the Act of 
Free Choice was in stark contrast to its involvement in East 
Timor, where despite the appalling violence and intimida-
tion, it was scrupulous in ensuring that the administration of 
the August 1999 'popular consultation' was free and fair. 
Pelletier agrees with the general conclusion of those who 
have said the act of free choice was a 'sham' and a 'white-
wash' and is in no doubt that a similar process would not be 
tolerated to the international community today. 
US Congressmen call for review 
In a separate development, two members of the US 
Congress, Eni Faleomavaega (D - American Samoa) and 
Donald Payne (D - New Jersey) have urged African nations 
to request a review of the UN's actions in Papua. A number 
of African countries expressed strong criticism of the Act of 
Free Choice when the matter was considered by the UN 
general assembly in 1969. 
The Congressmen were responding to a letter they 
received from the UN secretary-General, Kofin Annan, in 
which he said he would consider a review of the UN's 
involvement if the general assembly requested it. 
It is salutary that the Congressmen are using every oppor-
tunity to keep the issue of West Papua alive in Washington. 
[For more information on the UN involvement in the Act of 
Free Choice, see Dr John Saltford, The United Nations and 
the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: The 
Anatomy of a Betrayal, Routledge Curzon 2003 (hardback 
book) and Saltford, United Nations Involvement with the act 
of self-determination in West lrian (Indonesian West New 
Guinea) 1968 to 1969 (22-page article), Indonesia 69, 
Cornell University, April 2000, available from TAPOL]. 
continued from page 2 
The process leading to the Act of Free Choice itself got 
underway in the summer of 1968 with the arrival of the UN 
Secretary General's special representative, Ortiz Sanz. 
Indonesian pressure meant that his team was kept very 
small, 16 members in total. 
Drooglever describes how Sanz was overrun with peti-
tions from Papuans complaining about Indonesian misman-
agement in all kinds of areas. His referral of the complaints 
to his Indonesian counterpart was regarded as inappropriate 
interference. 
Sanz' advice on the form of the referendum was d1sre-
garded and a traditional Indonesian system under which 
only collective decisions and perfect consensus was possi-
ble, was chosen. Sanz' team was not allowed to play any 
part in putting together the electorate and was given the 
smallest possible role in the implementation of the referen-
dum itself. In the event, only 1,022 Papuans out of a popu-
lation of around 700,000 took part [see separate item, 'UN 
failed to ensure free choice']. 
When the matter was considered by the UN in November 
1969, the Secretary General, U Thant, was able to conclude 
only that an Act of Free Choice had been held. Drooglever 
says 'he was unable to use the definite article because the 
representative value of the operation had beenfar below the 
standards laid down in the Agreement of New York' [italics 
added] . 
The UN General Assembly failed to endorse the 
Secretary General's report, but simply 'took cognisance' of 
it. Regrettably, that was then considered sufficient to 
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